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Article
Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining
Prosecution of Elite Crime
MARY KREINER RAMIREZ
Recent financial scandals and the relative paucity of criminal
prosecutions against elite actors that spawned the crisis suggest a new
reality in the criminal law system: some wrongful actors appear to be
above the law and immune from criminal prosecution. As such, the
criminal prosecutorial system affirms much of the wrongdoing that gave
rise to the crisis. This leaves the same elites undisturbed at the apex of the
financial sector, and creates perverse incentives for any successors. Their
incumbency in power results in massive deadweight losses due to the
distorted incentives they now face. Further, this undermines the legitimacy
of the rule of law and encourages even more lawlessness among the entire
population, as the declination of prosecution advertises the profitability of
crime. These considerations transcend deterrence, as well as retribution,
as a traditional basis for criminal punishment. Affirmance is far more
costly and dangerous with respect to the crimes of powerful elites that
control large organizations than can be accounted for under traditional
notions of deterrence. Few limits are placed on a prosecutor’s
discretionary decision about whom to prosecute, and many factors against
prosecution take hold, especially in resource-intensive white-collar crime
prosecutions. This Article asserts that prosecutors should not decline
prosecution in these circumstances without considering the potential
affirmance of crime. Otherwise, the profitability of crime promises
massive future losses.
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Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining
Prosecution of Elite Crime
MARY KREINER RAMIREZ
“Governmental actions such as criminal prosecutions can be seen as
ceremonial and ritual performances that designate the content of public
morality and symbolize the public affirmation of social ideals and norms.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Hindsight may be twenty-twenty, but the facts leading up to the
financial crisis in 20082 demonstrate that hindsight was not required to
stave off the calamitous events in the financial markets over the past five
years. Whether government regulators, auditors, or credit rating
companies should have stepped in to stem the financial blood-letting, the
financiers in the industry knew better than to gamble with the nation’s
economic health.3 Central to the American criminal justice system is an


Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; J.D., 1986, St. Louis University School
of Law. In writing this Article, Professor Ramirez drew from her experiences serving thirteen years at
the Department of Justice, as a Trial Attorney with the Antitrust Division and as a Senior Trial
Attorney with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Kansas. She teaches White-Collar Crime, Criminal Law,
and Criminal Procedure, among other courses.
1
FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FIGHT TO CRIMINALIZE
BUSINESS VIOLENCE 365 (2d ed. 2006) (referencing Joseph Gusfield).
2
The financial crisis spans several years, culminating in the “profound events of 2007 and 2008”
and continuing beyond those years with multiple bank failures, mortgage company bankruptcies, and
real estate foreclosures, some of which continue even as this Article is penned. See, e.g., FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xi, xv (2011) [hereinafter FCIC
REPORT]. This Article refers to the “financial crisis” broadly to reference this period, or at times the
“financial crisis of 2008” because 2008 is the year in which the general public became aware of the
magnitude of the crisis, which began with the major bank collapses of Bear Stearns and of Lehman
Brothers, the takeover of Merrill Lynch, and most pointedly, when Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Paulson went to the President and Congress to recommend a bailout for the major banking institutions,
among others. See FCIC REPORT, supra at 280, 325, 353; infra Part II.
3
But see Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of
the Buy-out Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup chief executive
downplayed the fear of a downturn in the financial market). Citigroup Chief Charles Prince admitted
that a significant disruptive event would eventually cause cheap credit-fuelled buyout liquidity to exit
the market and “the party would end,” but that Citigroup would “keep dancing” until the music
stopped. Id. “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).

868

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:865

expectation that a known breach of the criminal laws will yield
punishment. In the aftermath of the federal bailouts,4 expectations that
CEOs would be held criminally accountable as had occurred after the fall
of Enron abounded, and they still do.5 Yet, despite congressional
investigations revealing knowing fraud6 and numerous fraud settlements
worth billions,7 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has not criminally
charged any of the key officers and managers of the financial institutions
deemed “too big to fail” or even of those “too big” that were allowed to
fail anyway.8

4

FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 386.
In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama advised the Attorney General to
address the lack of criminal responsibility that led to the housing crisis. President Obama remarked in
a State of the Union address:
5

And tonight I’m asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of Federal
prosecutors and leading State attorney generals to expand our investigations into the
abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis.
This new unit will hold accountable those who broke the law, speed assistance to
homeowners, and help turn the page on an era of recklessness that hurt so many
Americans.
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
8 (Jan. 24, 2012); see also Edward Wyatt & Shaila Dewan, New Housing Task Force Will Zero in on
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at B1 (reporting that “the unit would most likely focus on Wall
Street firms, big banks and other entities that many people thought had escaped scrutiny for their role in
the housing crisis,” and “could lead to charges of tax evasion, insurance fraud and securities fraud”).
6
See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii–xxiii (explaining that the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission found high rates of mortgage fraud and executives continued even with the threat of a
“financial and reputational catastrophe”).
7
See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Citigroup to Pay Millions to End Fraud Complaint, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2011, at A1 (reporting on $285 million civil fraud settlement with SEC on charges that
Citigroup misled investors by creating mortgage-related investments intended to fail, sold them to
unsuspecting investors, and bet against their success); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Pub. Affairs, Fed. Gov’t and State Attorneys Gen. Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest
Mortg. Servicers to Address Mortg. Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html (reaching $25 billion settlement with
nation’s five largest mortgage servicers); Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO, Litigation Release No. 21,592, 98 SEC Docket 3135–36
(Feb. 28, 2011) (alleging that Goldman Sachs committed securities fraud in connection with a subprime
mortgage product); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $153.6 Million to
Settle SEC Charges of Misleading Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Hous. Mkt. (June 21, 2011) (charges
concerned misleading investors in complex mortgage securities transaction).
8
Wyatt & Dewan, supra note 5 (noting that no major prosecutions have come out of the housing
crisis); Scot J. Paltrow, Insight: Top Justice Officials Connected to Mortgage Banks, REUTERS (Jan. 20,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-usa-holder-mortgage-idUSTRE80J0PH20120120
(reporting that Justice Department has failed to bring any criminal cases against companies involved in
mortgage crisis); Gabriel Sherman, The Meltdown Fall Guys, NYMAG.COM (Aug. 23, 2009),
http://nymag.com/guides/fallpreview/2009/businessmedia/58519/ (reporting that two hedge fund
managers are facing trial for their role in the June 2007 collapse of two hedge funds at Bear Stearnes,
yet no senior executives at Bear Stearnes, Lehman Brothers, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, or AIG,
have been charged with wrongdoing).
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Classic theories of punishment identify utilitarian and retributivist10
justifications for punishing criminal wrongdoing. Deterrence, a utilitarian
principle, suggests that by punishing the wrongdoer, he will learn that
criminal behavior has consequences; moreover, others will see the criminal
punished and also take away the message that crime doesn’t pay.11 The
retributivist justifies punishment of the wrongdoer as just payment for his
breach of society’s rules. Sometimes, however, the wrongdoer is not
criminally pursued. No charges are brought, no trial heard, no conviction
assessed, and no punishment imposed. Indeed, for most crimes, this is the
situation. Each decision not to pursue criminality is an exercise of
discretion.
Reasons for exercising discretion against pursuing criminality may be
varied.12 For the prosecutor, a weak case, an overload of cases, resource
9
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (John
Bowing ed., 1838) (“General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment as it is its real
justification. If we could consider an offence that has been committed as an isolated fact, the likes of
which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would be only adding one evil to another.”).
10
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 195–98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (rejecting
criminal punishment as a means to promote further good to society, but rather asserting that
punishment must be meted out to one convicted of a crime because the individual has committed that
crime); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 7 (1955) (“[R]etributionists have rightly
insisted . . . that no man can be punished unless he is guilty [of having] broken the law.”).
11
Deterrence as a theory of punishment seeks to alter human behavior by reminding individuals
that breaches of the law will be punished. Nonetheless, it is difficult to create an empirical study to
prove the efficacy of deterrence, since if it is effective, there is no means by which to identify those
who might otherwise have breached the law. See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED
JUSTIFICATION REVISITED 79–82 (2006) (identifying various alternative explanations aside from
deterrence as to why individuals may choose to not break the law). Nevertheless, Honderich identifies
“bits of evidence of a different kind” to support the efficacy of deterrence. Id. at 82. In 1944, the
Danish police were deported by the German occupying forces, leaving behind only a local guard force
that was unable to address the immense rise in property crimes—robberies, theft, fraud—although
“there was no comparable increase in murder or sexual crimes.” Id. The change in crime levels in
1944 Denmark might suggest that deterrence is more effective against certain economic crimes while
having virtually no impact on crimes that tend to involve “strong passions or deep psychological
problems.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing HOWARD JONES, CRIME AND THE PENAL
SYSTEM: A TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 123 (1956)).
12
See generally T. KENNETH MORAN & JOHN L. COOPER, DISCRETION AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS (1983) (exploring the exercise of discretion in the criminal justice process at various
stages). A victim may fail to report the crime, for instance, out of personal embarrassment, fear, or
hopelessness. See id. at 18–21. The police or other governmental investigative arm may choose not to
pursue a complaint or may decide to abandon investigation for myriad reasons including lack of
suspects or leads, other more pressing cases, lack of resources, lack of credibility of sources,
discouragement, bad publicity, or simply lack of motivation. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, SEC
Enforcement Cases Decline 9%; Staff Reduced Because of Budget Crunch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006,
at D3 (reporting on recent budget cuts and hiring freezes at the SEC); Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I.
Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (reporting on a loss of
625 agents—36% of its 2001 levels—for white-collar crime investigations as the administration shifted
its focus to antiterrorism). “[E]xecutives in the private sector say they have had difficulty attracting the
[FBI’s] attention in cases involving possible frauds of millions of dollars.” Id.
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considerations, or more compelling cases, to name a few, may factor into
that discretionary decision.13 Beyond these reasons lay other possibilities,
such as community remedies, civil alternatives to criminal punishment, or
perceived blameworthiness.14 Whatever the reason, one casualty of the
decision not to pursue justice in the face of a crime is the message that
“crime doesn’t pay.” Perhaps a minor casualty in minor crimes; however,
if the crime costs billions of dollars or more, or involves abuse of
economic power, the more likely message to both the wrongdoer and the
rest of us is one of “affirmance”: crime does pay.15 Some criminals will
13
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.000, 9-28.000
(1997) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL] (Principles of Federal Prosecution, and Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, respectively). The DOJ has explicit policies regarding
considerations for initiating and declining prosecution. See id. § 9-27.200, Initiating, and Declining
Prosecution—Probable Cause Requirement; § 9-27.220, Grounds for Commencing or Declining
Prosecution; § 9-27.230, Initiating and Declining Charges—Substantial Federal Interest; § 9-27.240,
Initiating and Declining Charges—Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction; § 9-27.250, Non-Criminal
Alternatives to Prosecution; § 9-27.260, Initiating And Declining Charges—Impermissible
Considerations; § 9-27.270, Records of Prosecutions Declined; see also Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s
Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE
LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 121, 130 (Austin
Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010). Holmes observes:

In general, individuals who are plugged into especially powerful networks receive
considerable advantages through the legal system administered by members of
privileged networks, who went to the same universities, belong to the same
congregations and clubs, vacation in the same locales, and so forth. The same
cannot be said for their socially marginalized or dispossessed cocitizens. Wellconnected insiders usually receive more indulgent treatment than poorly connected
outsiders, even in the case of undeniable lawbreaking. The effect of this skewed
distribution of leniency and severity on legal liability of government malefactors
goes without saying.
An important exception to impunity for the rich and powerful occurs when a
member of a socially influential network seriously injures a member of the same or
another socially powerful network. (Bernie Madoff is a recent example.)
Id. at 125.
14
See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2001).
15
See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE xiv–xv (2010). In the
prologue to The Big Short, Lewis reflected on the response to his first book, Liar’s Poker, which
described his experience in the bond market as an associate working at Salomon Brothers on Wall
Street from 1985 to 1988. While Lewis anticipated that the tale of reckless speculation in the bond
market yielding lucrative salaries to associates but massive losses to investors would warn young
people against careers in the financial markets, six months after the book was published he was
inundated with letters from college students using his book “as a how-to manual” and asking him to
share additional secrets about Wall Street. Id. at xiii–xv; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance
Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1459, 1478 (2009) (observing that regulatory, civil enforcement, and criminal prosecution
ideally “work in tandem to prevent business misconduct through a system of graduated penalties,” but
in practice, regulatory agencies “are beset with inherent barriers to effective enforcement” and “civil
actions do not provide effective remedies for or deterrence of business frauds,” leaving only criminal
law “to monitor business practices and to respond to public pressure for redress”). Professor Moohr
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persist in obtaining their fortunes no matter the risks, while others are
opportunistic players who jump in the game when the risk of punishment
for their acts is diminished. The failure by regulators, as well as other
individuals, to seize early opportunities to shut down subprime misconduct
arguably emboldened both groups, delivering tremendous financial
rewards to them and affirming their actions with every dollar that they
made.16
This Article argues that “affirmance” is as critical to appropriate
criminal law decision making as any of the extant theories of punishment.
Just as the belief that punishment restores order to society or
communicates messages that may deter future wrongdoing, affirmance
stands for the proposition that not pursuing or not punishing elite crime
adequately can undermine the rule of law,17 diminish confidence in
government,18 and promote further costly criminality.19 This Article
asserts that resorting to criminal prosecutions may “divert the public and legislators from the task of
devising more effective ways to control corporate misconduct.” This concern, however, ignores the
very nature of the problem, in that the same corporate leaders who engage in financial wrongdoing
spearhead limiting the effectiveness of regulatory oversight and weakening civil litigation as a means
of redressing misconduct. Id. at 1474, 1476, 1479. Indeed, criminal prosecution is the last resort for
the very reasons she observes.
16
See infra Parts I, V.D.
17
The rule of law is undermined when misconduct is reinforced through benefits gained to the
perpetrator by shirking the rules. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS,
AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECOMONY 135 (2010) (describing how the repeated bailouts of banks
in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s “sent a strong signal to the banks not to worry about bad lending, as the
government will pick up the pieces”); see also B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 64–65
(1953) (explaining that operant conditioning changes or establishes behavior by reinforcing an
individual’s response to events or stimuli in the environment). A reinforcer, or operant, is an
environmental response to an individual’s behavior that increases the probability of repeating the
behavior, ultimately strengthening the behavior and its frequency. SKINNER, supra at 65. Positive
reinforcement occurs when a rewarding environmental stimulus or consequence follows an individual’s
behavior. Id. at 73. Negative reinforcement occurs when the environmental consequence allows the
individual to avoid an unpleasant consequence when the individual’s behavior occurs. Id.
Reinforcement differs from punishment, which intends to weaken or eliminate a response, rather than
to increase a behavior’s frequency through gained benefits. Id. at 182.
18
Confidence is diminished when members of the group perceive that the rules are unfairly
applied. See FRANS DE WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY: NATURE’S LESSONS FOR A KINDER SOCIETY
162, 167, 188 (2009) (discussing how human sense of fairness and trust fuel our society and how the
2008 bailouts highlighted public distrust of the wealthy and the government); Steven M. Sheffrin &
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance,
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 195, 210–13 (Joel Slemrod
ed., 1992) (reporting on study showing that reading about the tax gap and the $100 billion not collected
by the IRS negatively impacted students’ confidence in the tax system and compliance compared to
reading about IRS’s increased compliance efforts).
19
Criminality is promoted in two ways. First, the risk of punishment is lessened so that a moral
hazard is created; the criminal actor pursues criminal conduct because no deterrent measures are
expected, so the actor reaps the gains from the criminal act while the losses are borne by the victims.
In the case of massive fraud or environmental destruction requiring taxpayers to bear the losses, the
hazard extends even further because the failure to prosecute is widely viewed as undermining the rule
of law. See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
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focuses upon affirming “elite crimes” (particularly corporate and financial
elites) committed by those who may be perceived to be “above the law”
due to the position held at the time the crime was committed, to favorable
socioeconomic status, or to political ties to power. Given the prominence
of their acts and the costs to society, affirming crimes by these elites is far
more costly than mere failure to deter crimes such as auto theft.20
Part II of this Article reviews the recent financial crisis, identifies some
indicators of criminal conduct and its cost to the American and global
economies. Setting forth the specific facts supporting a criminal case for
the prosecution of particular individuals is beyond the scope of this Article.
The purpose of the review is merely to suggest that given what is known,
one would expect some criminal actions by the DOJ.21 Indeed, the Article
highlights relevant considerations that ought to be included in making an
assessment about whether to pursue criminal charges.
Part III surveys the numerous factors embedded in prosecutors’
discretionary decisions, some explicit and others implicit in the process.
These factors take into account competing demands for resources, casespecific sufficiency assessments, ethical obligations, and community
interests in alternative non-criminal resolutions, among others. Noticeably
absent from this traditional list is any consideration of the cost associated
with allowing society’s wealthiest and best-connected citizens to escape
prosecution.
Part IV briefly discusses the punishment theories underlying criminal
justice. Central to understanding affirmance is recognizing that it goes
beyond concepts of retribution or deterrence. Affirmance focuses on the
BAILOUTS 17 (2004) (describing how insurance policies create a moral hazard because they may
encourage risk taking by the insured, since the losses will be borne by the insurer). Second, bad
behavior is modeled for others, who may face greater risk of punishment but disregard that risk because
of an expectation of fair play. See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Analysis of Aggression, in
ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENCY AND AGGRESSION 203, 204–06, 212 (Albert Bandura & Emilio RibesInesta eds., 1976) (explaining that affirmance functions as a modeling influence and is an effective way
to encourage people to behave as they have observed others behaving).
20
See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Case on Mortgage Official Is Said to Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2011, at A20 (reporting that federal prosecutors have closed the criminal investigation of
former CEO of Countrywide Financial, Angelo R. Mozilo, who settled on insider trading charges by
the SEC in October 2010 for $67.5 million, $45 million of which was paid by Countrywide and its
successor in bankruptcy, Bank of America; Mozilo received total compensation of $521.5 million while
heading up Countrywide from 2000 to 2008). In 2006, Countrywide’s revenues peaked at $11.4
billion. Id. Countrywide, which had 62,000 employees and assets of $200 billion during the housing
boom, barely avoided bankruptcy when Bank of America acquired it in 2008 with a value of $2.8
billion. Countrywide Financial Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/to
p/news/business/companies/countrywide_financial_corporation/index.html?inline=nyt-org. Mozilo left
when Bank of America acquired Countrywide. Id.
21
But see Paltrow, supra note 8 (highlighting a federal conflict of interest between U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder and Lanny Breuer, head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, due to their
prior employment representing big banks who are now at the center of the alleged foreclosure fraud).
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costs and consequences of failing to strip the powerful of their continued
wealth and position. Offenders enjoy the rich desserts of their
wrongdoing, rather than the “just desserts” of retribution. Affirmance is
the flip side to deterrence because affirmance encourages both specific
criminality and general criminality. It extends beyond both approaches to
punishment—especially in the case of well-publicized wrongdoing of the
elite class—because the accompanying infamy advertises exponential
future wrongdoing, while wrongdoers undermining the rule of law remain
in power and are often richly compensated from their crime.
Part V considers the social meaning behind the choices of who is
punished and what crimes are punished. The converse is also considered:
who is not punished and what ideas are expressed by decisions declining
criminal investigation or punishment. This meaning is central to the
bloated effects of affirmance of elite crime. Whether the individuals’
actions through powerful corporations result in the death of customers or
employees, the destruction of an ecosystem or, as considered in this
Article, the financial ruin of families or countries, under-punishment, or
failure to prosecute these actors redefines the rule of law, affirms their
behavior, and further invites moral hazard. Affirmance of high-profile
crimes results in high-profile advertisement of criminal profitability, and
thus incentivizes far more costly criminality and cynicism.22
This Article concludes by suggesting that prosecutors must exercise
their discretion to decline prosecutions, accept plea bargains, or offer noncriminal alternative sanctions, all the while bearing in mind the affirming
effect of that decision, particularly in elite crimes. Ignoring affirmance to
gain politically expedient resolutions23 expresses a social meaning at odds
with a cohesive criminal justice system, and thereby undermines the
22
See, e.g., Colin Barr, Where Are the Subprime Perp Walks?, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 15,
2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/15/news/subprime.perpwalk.fortune/index.htm (noting the lack
of prosecutions of high profile subprime mortgage executives whose excesses led to the financial crisis
in 2007); Jean Eaglesham, Criminal Mortgage Probes Fizzle Out, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, at B1
(reporting that three high-profile investigations into the subprime mortgage crisis have gone dormant or
have been closed without any criminal prosecutions); Editorial, Soft on Crime Our View o [sic] Skating
Free After Bringing the Economy to Its Knees, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 28, 2011, at A16
(“Americans [have] a gnawing sense that no justice was done, that the guys who wrecked everything
got away with it.”).
23
See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2011, at A1 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met with then-New York
Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo to express concern about the fragility of the financial system and
a desire to calm markets, “a goal that could be complicated by a hard-charging attorney general”); Jon
Talton, WaMu: No Justice, No Peace (of Mind), SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011, 10:15 AM),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/soundeconomywithjontalton/2015891715_wamu_no_justice_no
_peace_of_mi.html (observing that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has not prosecuted a single
major figure behind the “greatest financial collapse since 1929”). In his article, Talton asks, “Any
curiosity at all, Mr. Holder? Or are you planning for your next job at Goldman after the 2012
elections.” Talton, supra.
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II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial crisis in the United States in the fall of 2008 manifested
itself much earlier than first reported. Prior to former Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson’s alarm in September 2008 warning of a financial market
meltdown unless billions in bailout funds were handed to him for
disbursement,25 the average American may have been unaware of the
trillions of dollars trading in derivatives26 in virtually unregulated
markets,27 and may not have known that the subprime mortgage industry
was handing out liar’s loans like candy bars on Halloween.28 Nevertheless,
24
See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion, Popular Culture, and
the Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641, 1642–44 (2003) (arguing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion shapes the law). Paul Horwitz observes there is a distinction “between the rule
of law as an ideal, and the implementation of the rule of law,” and whatever the absolute state of the
rule of law demands, “it still requires implementation in practical forms, and those mechanisms of
implementation may vary depending on the context.” Paul Horwitz, Democracy as the Rule of Law, in
WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW, supra note 13, at 153, 157. In a democracy, the people define
the rules of the game, but may also redefine those rules through voting, legislation, or even
constitutional amendment. See id. at 159 (describing voting as “a form of controlled revolutionary
activity” in a democratic society). Moreover, in a democratic society, the rules of the game must
ultimately be subject to popular control in order “to command the respect and obedience of the people
who are subject to it.” Id. at 159–60. Affirmance, through prosecutorial discretion, undermines
democratic society.
25
See Andrew R. Sorkin et al., As Credit Crisis Spiraled, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis
Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1 (noting that the request for $700 billion dollars in funds was
parsed in the fear of total economic meltdown); Treasury’s Bailout Proposal, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept.
20, 2009, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/20/news/economy/treasury_proposal/index.htm
(requesting an authorized limit of $700 billion in bailout funds for the purchase of mortgage-related bad
assets).
26
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii (noting the widespread failure in self-regulation and
the trillions of dollars risked through “shadow banking” and “over-the-counter derivatives markets”).

Derivatives are financial contracts whose prices are determined by, or “derived”
from, the value of some underlying asset, rate, index, or event. They are not used
for capital formation or investment, as are securities; rather, they are instruments for
hedging business risk or for speculating on changes in prices, interest rates, and the
like. Derivatives come in many forms; the most common are over-the-counter
swaps and exchange-traded futures and options. . . . A firm may hedge its price risk
by entering into a derivatives contract that offsets the effect of price movements.
Losses suffered because of price movements can be recouped through gains on the
derivatives contract.
Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
27
See generally andré douglas pond cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of 2002,
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 529–36 (2007) (explaining how the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act does not allow for the regulation of derivatives).
28
See Joe Nocera, In Prison for Taking a Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1
(discussing an example of a loan borrower being imprisoned for lying on mortgage forms at the
encouragement of his broker); see also RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME LENDER: AN
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there were early indications that something was amiss.
As early as 1998, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)
Chairwoman Brooksley Born registered concern about the expansion in the
unregulated derivatives markets and related losses, and sought to impose
regulations on the derivatives market.30 Not only were her efforts derailed,
but Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Chairman
Arthur Levitt lobbied successfully to prohibit derivatives trading from
being regulated, and ultimately affirmatively removed derivatives from
coming within the purview of the CFTC.31 Their efforts to derail
derivatives regulation were nearly foiled by the meltdown of Long-Term
Capital Management (“LTCM”) in September 1998,32 but despite a
glimpse of catastrophic losses that could arise from the unregulated
derivatives trading,33 Congress was persuaded to place a moratorium on the
INSIDER’S TALE OF GREED, FRAUD, AND IGNORANCE 73, 80–96 (2008) (describing “[t]he [a]rt of
[c]reative [f]inancing” in subprime mortgage lending to qualify borrowers for mortgage loans, which
the author termed “[m]aking [c]hicken [s]alad [o]ut of [c]hicken [s]hit”) .
29
See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,114 (May 12, 1998) (noting the
increased sophistication and volume of over-the-counter derivatives and encouraging new safeguards).
30
Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009) (interview with Brooksley
Born, former Chairperson, CFTC), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/inter
views/born.html.
31
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 47–48 (noting that in October 1998, Congress passed a
moratorium on the CFTC’s ability to regulate over-the-counter derivatives, as requested by Rubin,
Greenspan, and Levitt); cummings, supra note 27, at 530–31 (describing the response to Director
Born’s study and the CFTC concept release as being ultimately “quashed by Congress”); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Fed. Reserve Bd.
Chairman Alan Greenspan, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Chairman Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx (questioning the
“jurisdiction” of the CFTC in the derivatives market).
32
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 56–58. “LTCM” was a hedge fund that experienced
“devastating losses on its $125 billion portfolio” after Russia defaulted on part of its national debt,
causing a panic in junk bonds and emerging market debt. Id. at 56–57. LTCM had a high-risk
leveraging strategy that borrowed $24 for every $1 of investors’ equity, so that when the capital market
panicked, the fund lost 80% of its equity ($4 billion) resulting in $120 billion in debt. Id. LTCM also
had derivative contracts worth about $1 trillion, and the concern was that because of the limited equity
in the firm, it could fail if the fund’s counterparties attempted to liquidate their positions
simultaneously. Id. at 57. Behind-the-scenes emergency maneuvering by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York organized fourteen of the largest financial institutions with large exposures to LTCM (later
central players in the taxpayer bailout of those banks) “to inject $3.6 billion into LTCM in return for
90% of its stock.” Id. All but one of the fourteen institutions (Bear Stearns declined) contributed
between $100 million and $300 million. Id.
33
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 46–47 (noting the “wave of significant losses and scandals
[that] hit the market” between 1994 to 1998 after the CFTC “exempt[ed] certain nonstandardized OTC
derivatives” from trading on a regulated exchange). But see Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large
Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin.
Servs., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Chairman), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm (claiming that there was a “relative
absence of such examples over the past five years” and that “[d]ynamic markets periodically engender
large defaults”).
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CFTC’s ability to regulate over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives. In
December 2000, Congress “in essence deregulated the OTC derivatives
market and eliminated oversight by both the CFTC and the SEC.”34 In
2004, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents were asking for more
investigators to address fraud in the mortgage industry; their pleas were
ignored.35 In 2005, a cover story from The Economist reported on the
worldwide rise in house prices as “the biggest bubble in history,” and
urged Americans to “[p]repare for the economic pain when it pops.”36 In
2006, New York University economist Nouriel Roubini warned the
audience at an International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, D.C.
of a coming crisis; he was not alone.37 In August 2007, more warning bells

34
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; see also Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (deregulating OTC derivatives by enacting H.R. 5660 into
law); cummings, supra note 27, at 533 (describing how Congress refused to regulate OTC derivatives
by removing OTC transaction regulations).
35
As early as 2004, the FBI suspected fraud in the mortgage and subprime mortgage market, but
did not pursue the investigation due to a lack of funding and staffing after overall FBI staffing
decreased between 2001 and 2007 and resources were shifted to post-September 11, 2001 national
security priorities. See Lichtblau et al. supra note 12, at A1 (reporting a loss of 625 agents—36% of
the FBI’s 2001 levels). Executives in the private sector also complained of “difficulty attracting the
bureau’s attention in cases involving possible frauds of millions of dollars.” Id. Emblematic of
governmental disregard for the rampant financial abuses beginning in May 2000 and continuing to
2008, regulators at the SEC repeatedly ignored the persistent claims by a citizen whistleblower named
Harry Markopolis that Bernie Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi
Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on
Regulatory Failures] (statement of Harry Markopolos, Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Fraud
Examiner); David Gelles & Gillian Tett, From Behind Bars, Madoff Spins His Story, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
8, 2011 5:04 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a29d2b4a-60b7-11e0-a18200144feab49a.html?ftcamp=traffic/email/regsnl//memmkt/#axzz1JMG01lMV (noting that the firm was
founded in 1960 and Madoff claims that the Ponzi scheme first began in the early 1990s, whereas
Irving Picard, the trustee seeking to retrieve assets for Madoff’s victims, asserts that the fraud began as
early as 1983). Although Markopolis’s efforts to gain the attention of SEC investigators continued
over a period of eight and a half years, and included his own undercover investigation and supporting
documents to aid the SEC, Madoff was not investigated by the SEC until after he confessed
spontaneously to his sons. See Amir Efrati et al. Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A1 (describing the manner in which Madoff confessed to his sons). By then, the
losses had grown to an estimated $50 billion to $65 billion. Hearing on Regulatory Failures, supra; see
also Efrati, supra (placing the value of the Ponzi scheme at $50 billion); Gelles & Tett, supra (placing
the value of the Ponzi scheme at $65 billion). Madoff, who in 2009, at age 70, pled guilty to eleven
counts of fraud, money laundering, perjury, and theft, is serving a 150-year federal sentence. Diana B.
Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1; Diana B.
Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Jailed After Pleading Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at
A1.
36
Special Report: The Global Housing Boom; in Come the Waves, THE ECONOMIST, June 16,
2005.
37
NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE
OF FINANCE 1–3 (2010). Roubini and Mihm identify a number of respected experts who issued
warnings of coming disaster:
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38

sounded when credit markets tightened. Prior to their collapses, several
of the banks showed stress.39 By the time Paulson approached President
George W. Bush in 2008, financial markets were on the brink of collapse 40
and losses were in the trillions of dollars.41 To stave off implosion of the
American financial markets, banks, investment banks, mortgage
companies, insurance companies, and others received billions of dollars in
bailouts for their firms at taxpayers’ expense.42 One insurance company,

Robert Shiller [of Yale University], was far ahead of almost everyone in warning of
the dangers of a stock market bubble in advance of the tech bust; more recently, he
was one of the first economists to sound the alarm about the housing bubble. . . . In
2005[,] University of Chicago finance professor Raghuram Rajan told a crowd of
high-profile economists and policy makers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that the
ways bankers and traders were being compensated would encourage them to take on
too much risk and leverage, making the global financial system vulnerable to a
severe crisis. . . . Wall Street legend James Grant warned in 2005 that the Federal
Reserve had helped create one of “the greatest of all credit bubbles” in the history of
finance; William White, chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements,
warned about the systemic risks of asset and credit bubbles; financial analyst Nassim
Nicholas Taleb cautioned that the financial markets were woefully unprepared to
handle “fat tail” events that fell outside the usual distribution of risk; economists
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff warned about the unsustainability of current
account deficits in the United States; and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley and
David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch long ago raised concerns about consumers in the
United States living far beyond their means. The list goes on.
Id. at 3.
38
See Les Christie, Mortgage Meltdown Contagion: A Grim Forecast Has Economists More
Pessimistic Over How Far the Collapse Will Spread to the Rest of the Economy, CNNMONEY.COM
(Aug. 13, 2007, 11:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/10/real_estate/mortgage_meltdown_crushi
ng_other_markets/index.htm (noting that the housing market’s collapse sparked fears that “tighter
credit will have a broader impact on consumers, markets and the economy”).
39
See STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 136 (stating that in the first two weeks of August 2007, the
European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve supplied “massive liquidity to the market” with the
European Central Bank injecting around $274 billion, and the Federal Reserve injecting $38 billion
“[a]t the first signs of problems”); see also Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down,
CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 12, 2007, 12:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archiv
e/2007/11/26/101232838/ (archiving the list of banks and financial institutions damaged by the
financial collapse).
40
See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 254 (2010) (stating that the mortgage crisis was the “economic equivalent
of war” and that the markets were “ready to collapse”).
41
See Richard Frost & Kyung Bok Cho, Asian Stocks Rally, Treasuries Drop on Fannie, Freddie
Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aq8tCTiwjJmY (reporting that “[m]ore than $17 trillion in global equity value has been wiped out since
October as the collapse of the subprime debt market and a U.S. housing recession slowed global
economies”); see also PAULSON, supra note 40, at 255–56 (describing the Presidential briefing
regarding the financial collapse).
42
See NOMI PRINS, IT TAKES A PILLAGE 13–14 (2009) (calculating that in the summer of 2009 the
federal government’s bailout of the banks was approximately $13.3 trillion—which “is more money
than the combined costs of every major U.S. war at that time—and observing that “$50 trillion in
global weath was erased between September 2007 and March 2009”); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG
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responsible for guaranteeing a large amount of subprime mortgages,
received $182 billion alone.43
While the financial markets careened toward disaster and narrowly
escaped total collapse due to taxpayer-funded bailouts, unemployment
skyrocketed to near-Great Depression levels.44 Unemployment benefits
were extended several times in an effort to address high long-term
unemployment rates.45 Spiraling unemployment rates left homeowners
jobless just as low-interest teaser rates on the easy mortgage loans expired
and were replaced by higher rates and monthly payments that exceeded the
income levels of the mortgagors.46 As foreclosures flooded the real estate
FAIL 396–99 (2009) (describing how even prior to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”),
which was adopted by Congress in 2008 to bail out the financial markets and despite the fact that it was
an insurance company, AIG received $85 billion from the Federal Reserve, pulling it from the brink of
bankruptcy); Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81,
89–90 (2009) (describing the $96 billion effort to bail out government sponsored entities, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, and the “Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program” by which the FDIC guaranteed
all bank debt); David Goldman, CNNMoney.com’s Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cn
n.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (using sources from
the Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC, CBO, and White House to track the various federal programs
used to bailout the economy and reporting that, as of November 16, 2009, $11 trillion had been
committed for bailouts with $3 trillion of those funds extended by that date). In all, AIG received a
total of $182 billion in federal bailout money. Christian Plumb, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of AIG
Executives, REUTERS (May 22, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/23/us-aig-dojidUSTRE64L09W20100523. Whether the bailout of AIG was a consequence of its political ties, or a
necessity because its bankruptcy would have left so many major banks and other financial institutions
“holding the worthless mortgage investments, including Goldman Sachs,” Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson’s former company, and subject to cascading bankruptcies, remains a subject of debate. Carol
D. Leonnig, AIG Founder Wielded Personal Influence in Washington, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2008, at
A15.
43
Plumb, supra note 42. Among those companies that received bailouts, some of it has been
repaid. See Goldman, supra note 42 (tracking companies that have repaid some of the bailout money).
44
See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 63 (calculating that the economy lost eight million jobs
between December 2007 and October 2009, and that, given the number of new entrants to the job
markets, twelve million jobs would be required to restore the economy to full employment); Eleni
Theodossiou & Steven F. Hipple, Unemployment Remains High in 2010, 134 MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Mar. 2011, at 3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/03/art1exc.htm (reporting that “the
number of long-term unemployed reached a record high” in the fourth quarter of 2010, and that the
9.6% unemployment rate was the first improvement in the rate since the 2007–2009 recession and was
“down from a 26-year high of 10.0 percent a year earlier”).
45
See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, H.R. 3630, 112th Cong.
§§ 2121–24 (2012) (extending unemployment benefits by modifying the end dates of the emergency
employment compensation program, the Unemployed Workers and Struggling Families Act, and
benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); Carl Hulse, Senate Is Set to Extend Aid to
the Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A1 (detailing the political battle within the Senate over
whether unemployment benefits should be extended); Robert Pear & Jennifer Steinhauer, Congress
Passes Tax Cut Extension, and Everyone Claims a Win, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A16 (reporting
on compromise that extended tax cuts and unemployment benefits).
46
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16; see PRINS, supra note 42, at 54 (calculating losses at $6 trillion
in the U.S. housing market, $7.5 trillion in pension plans and household portfolios, $5.6 trillion in other
assets, and an increase in joblessness from 7.5 to 14.7 million as unemployment nearly doubled in the
eighteen months between January 2008 and June 2009).
TO
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market with bargain-priced homes for sale, the buyers retreated to wait out
the shift as real estate prices dropped, leaving over a quarter of all
homeowners with homes valued below their outstanding mortgage owed.47
The Mortgage Bankers’ Association warned consumers that walking away
from mortgage obligations was irresponsible48 only one month before it
reportedly refused to provide the terms of a deal it made with creditors
after vacating its new facilities.49 Foreclosures since the crisis have
reached record numbers, with more waiting to be processed.50
American Insurance Group (“AIG”) was the world’s largest insurance
company and one of its units, AIG Financial Products Corporation
(“AIG FP”), “dominated dealing in OTC derivatives,” accumulating a onehalf trillion dollar position in credit default swaps.51 AIG recognized the
income from these derivatives without creating any reserves for possible
losses,52 basically insuring subprime mortgages through these derivatives.
47
See Beth Braverman, Homeowners Abandoning Houses En Masse, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 30,
2010, 4:12 PM), http://moremoney.blogs.money.cnn.com/2010/04/30/homeowners-abandoninghouses-en-masse/ (“A quarter of all borrowers—11.3 million homeowners—were underwater on their
mortgages at the end of 2009.”).
48
Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk Away, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at MM15. In May 2010, the
CBS news show 60 Minutes reported on “strategic default[s]” in which borrowers walked away from
mortgage obligations when the value of the property falls significantly below the obligations, also
known as being “underwater” on one’s loan. 60 Minutes: Mortgages: Walking Away (CBS television
broadcast May 9, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6470184n&tag=relate
d;photovideo. The Wall Street Journal has also reported on strategic defaults. Dawn Wotapka, So
You’re Underwater, What’s Next?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2009, 12:02 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/devel
opments/2009/11/24/so-youre-underwater-whats-next/.
49
See James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Group in Property Pinch, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2010, at C1
(reporting that the Mortgage Bankers Association’s was selling its headquarters building for
substantially less than it owes its lenders). The Mortgage Bankers Association purchased the
Washington, D.C. building for $79 million, and after sold the building to CoStar Group for a mere
$41.3 million, it moved five blocks away into rental space. Id.
50
See RealtyTrac Reports Foreclosure Activity Dips 15 Percent in Q1 of 2011,
NATIONALMORTGAGEPROFESSIONAL.COM (Apr. 15, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://nationalmortgageprofessi
onal.com/news24664/realtytrac-reports-foreclosure-activity-dips-15-percent-q1-2011 (March 2010 had
the highest monthly total of foreclosure notices since the inception of RealtyTrac monthly reports in
January 2005, with 367,056 homeowners receiving a foreclosure notice.). In the first quarter of 2011,
foreclosures fell to a three-year low, with one in every 191 U.S. housing units receiving a foreclosure
filing. Id.
51
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. The report stated:

A key OTC derivative in the financial crisis was the credit default swap. . . . The
purchaser of a CDS transferred to the seller the default risk of an underlying debt.
The debt security could be any bond or loan obligation. The CDS buyer made
periodic payments to the seller during the life of the swap. In return, the seller
offered protection against default or specified “‘credit events”’ such as a partial
default. If a credit event such as a default occurred, the CDS seller would typically
pay the buyer the face value of the debt.
Id.
52
Id. Although a CDS is often compared to insurance, there are two key distinctions: (1) CDS
can be used to speculate on the losses of others’ property or interests because the purchaser of the CDS
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When borrowers began defaulting on subprime mortgages, financial
institutions holding the credit default swaps sought to have AIG post
collateral under the terms of the credit default swaps.53 When the housing
bubble burst, AIG FP had guaranteed billions of dollars worth of subprime
mortgages for which it could not pay.54 Yet, AIG told investors that it had
no material exposure to subprime losses even though it posted $2 billion in
collateral to Goldman Sachs to cover losses.55
At the same time that the U.S. government was bailing out the largest
banks in America from their high-risk gambles arising from trading
derivatives in the mortgage and subprime mortgage markets,56 calls to aid
homeowners who were unable to meet their repayments were met with
objections from the financial markets, arguing that doing so would create a
moral hazard57—that is, a disincentive to pay their mortgages because
owners would hold out hope of a bailout.58 Moral hazard did not impede
the flow of bailout funds to lenders.
need not have a property interest in the underlying debt (somewhat akin to being able to insure your
neighbor’s car and then hoping the car will crash so that you may cash in on the insurance policy); and
(2) the seller of the CDS is not required to put aside financial reserves in case of loss as regulated
insurers must. Id.
53
Id. at 273–74.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 270.
56
PAULSON, supra note 40, at 364, 368. On Monday, October 13, 2008, nine banks agreed to
receive $125 billion to address massive undercapitalization in the banking system: Citigroup, Wells
Fargo, and JPMorgan all received $25 billion; Bank of America received $15 billion; Merrill Lynch,
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley each received $10 billion; Bank of New York Mellon received $3
billion; and State Street Corporation received $2 billion. Id. at 364. Among the basic conditions of
each bank’s loan, their CEOs signed on to as a condition of the loans was to “expand the flow of credit
to U.S. consumers and businesses; and to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms
of residential mortgages, as appropriate.” Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsequent
events would reveal that the bankers did not diligently work to modify residential mortgage terms and,
in some cases, seemed to actively delay or even undermine modification. See, e.g., State of Nevada v.
Bank of Am. Corp., Case No. A-10-631557-B XXV (D. Ct. Clark Cnty., Nev., Dec. 17, 2010)
(Complaint), available at http://www.s355160796.onlinehome.us/_oneclick_uploads/2012/03/state-ofnevada-vs-ank-of-america.pdf); Andrew Martin and Michael Powell, Two States Sue Bank of America
Over Mortgages, NY TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/b
usiness/18mortgage.html (reporting on complaints filed by the attorneys general of Arizona and
Nevada that “accused Bank of America of assuring customers that they would not be foreclosed upon
while they were seeking loan modification, only to proceed with foreclosures anyway; of falsely telling
customers that they must be in default to botain a modification; of promising that the modifications
would be made permanent if they completed a trial period, only to renege on the deal; and of conjuring
up bogus reasons for denying modifications”).
57
See Richard Eskow, Foreclosures and Guilt: The “Home Loan Moral Hazard Scorecard,”
OURFUTURE.ORG (Oct. 18, 2010, 2:45 AM), http://www.ourfuture.org/blogentry/2010104218/foreclosures-and-guilt-home-loan-moral-hazard-scorecard (providing a “scorecard”
comparing the moral hazard of bankers versus borrowers in the wake of the 2008 subprime mortgage
crisis); PRINS, supra note 42, at 37, 108 (citing statements made by Treasury Secretary Paulson that
government intervention to aid home mortgage borrowers would be inappropriate).
58
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16.
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Bankruptcies also hit record levels as businesses failed due to lack of
available credit,59 while the bailed-out banks hoarded funds due to the need
for liquidity,60 favorable interest rates from the federal reserve,61 and the
lucrative investment opportunities in the derivatives market.62 In fact, as of
September 2012, the bailed-out banking sector sat on nearly $1.5 trillion in
excess reserves.63
By 2010, courts began to realize that banks and their representatives
had been using forged documents and fraudulent affidavits to foreclose on
properties in thousands of cases.64 Rather than acting contrite, the CEOs of
the bailed out corporations gave themselves and their top managers hefty
bonuses and “retention grants.”65
59

See, e.g., Christine Dugas, Small Businesses Vital to Economic Recovery Go Bankrupt, USA
TODAY (July 2, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/smallbusiness/2009-06-30-smallbusinesses-bankruptcy_N.htm (citing the difficulty in getting small business loans due to the credit
crunch and the inability to rely upon credit cards among reasons for the bankruptcies); Michael J. de la
Merced, General Growth Properties Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2009, 2:34
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/general-growth-properties-files-for-bankruptcy/ (stating
that the company president “cit[ed] ‘the unprecedented disruption in the real estate financing markets
and the need to extend maturing debt’ as the reason [his] company filed” for bankruptcy).
60
See Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, supra note 42, at 97–99 (stating that
“zombie banks” hurt the economy by hoarding capital to repay the government and averting
intervention by the government when losses were imminent).
61
See STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 138 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve’s decision to begin
paying interest on bank reserves held in deposit at the Federal Reserve was “counterproductive”
because it encouraged banks to keep the money at the Federal Reserve rather than lending it out to
borrowers).
62
See Matt Wirz & Serena Ng, Subprime Bonds Are Back—As Encomony Recovers, Long-Term
Investors Willing to Take on More Risks, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at A1 (reporting that banks, and
even bailed-out insurance giant, AIG, have returned to investing in subprime and other residential
mortgage bonds because the higher risk associated with those bonds also provides the opportunity for
higher yields on the investments).
63
Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions (EXCRESNS), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
(Sept. 7, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXCRESNS.
64
See, e.g., Joe Rauch & Clare Baldwin, BofA, Wells, Citi See Foreclosure Probe Fines,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/26/us-banks-foreclosuresidUSTRE71P0AT20110226 (“The biggest U.S. mortgage lenders are being investigated by 50 state
attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing on homes without having proper paperwork in
place or without having properly reviewed paperwork before signing it.”).
65
See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY
OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 154 (Comm. Print 2011) (describing how the executive committee
members at Washington Mutual were exempted from the 2008 bonuses after public outcry and instead,
quietly given “retention grants”); STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 56 (stating that despite the banks
tightened lending decisions, executives received near record bonuses); Edmund L. Andrews & Peter
Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1
(reporting that AIG planned to pay about $165 million in bonuses to executives that brought the
company to the brink of collapse the prior year); Peter Cohan, Goldman Sachs: $1 Billion for Charity,
$23 Billion for Banker Bonuses, DAILY FIN. (Oct. 13, 2009, 10:15 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/goldman-sachs-1-billion-for-charity-23-billion-for-bankerbo/19193897/ (criticizing Goldman Sachs for giving $23 billion in bonuses in light of the $12.9 billion
taxpayer dollars used to bail the company out of a bad CDS bet with AIG); Eric Dash & Louise Story,
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Not surprisingly, such catastrophic failures of capital management led
to calls for criminal investigations into the practices of the financial
corporations and the people who ran them.66 Those who benefited from
creating the subprime mortgage debacle faced civil and regulatory fines,
yet no senior executives, nor their firms, have been criminally charged.67
Although the financial crisis extended across the globe and a number of
corporations failed or were bailed out, corporations at the center of the
crisis typify the pervasive recklessness and misconduct yielding outrageous
fortunes to the few at the expense of the many.68
Citigroup’s Top Officers to Decline ’08 Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B1 (detailing that in
2008, financial executives and senior bankers received lower bonuses due to earning results); Stephen
Grocer, Banks Set for Record Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2010, at A1 (reporting that major U.S. banks
and securities firms are still paying their employees a massive $145 billion for 2009, despite public
frustration with Wall Street’s pay culture); Ben White, What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A1 (reporting that despite losses and bailouts, employees at financial
companies in New York collected an estimated $18.4 billion in bonuses in 2008); see also ROUBINI &
MIHM, supra note 37, at 68–69 (explaining how the financial industry’s reliance upon bonuses as a
compensation mechanism created the moral hazard of encouraging excessive risk-taking to incur shortterm profits that would enhance bonuses).
66
See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 241 (reporting that two Bear Sterns executives were
criminally charged with fraud for communications with investors after major losses in two
hedgefunds); Morgenson & Story, supra note 23 (reporting that the regulators’ failure to compile
information that could lead to criminal prosecution has slowed efforts to charge senior executives);
Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 2011, at 44 (criticizing regulatory
agencies for failing to hold financial companies and executives on Wall Street criminally accountable
for the economic collapse).
67
See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Report: DOJ Criminal Chief Lanny Breuer Stepping Down, PBS
FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/untouchables/report-doj-criminal-chief-lanny-breuer-stepping-down/
(reporting
that
the
Washington Post report that Breuer is stepping down came a day after a PBS Frontline report aired in
which Breuer defended the lack of criminal prosecutions against Wall Street executives or their
companies that were at the center of the 2008 financial meltdown); Jason M. Breslow, Too Big to Jail?
The Top Ten Civil Cases Against the Banks, PBS FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/too-big-tojail-the-top-10-civil-cases-against-the-banks/ (describing the top civil cases brought in lieu of criminal
prosecutions against the banks at the center of the 2008 financial meltdown); Eaglesham, supra note 22
(reporting on three separate DOJ investigations against Washington Mutual Inc., IndyMac Bancorp,
and New Century Financial Corp. that were either stalled or closed); Joe Nocera, Biggest Fish Face
Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1 (describing the lack of prosecution of
many executives of financial corporations that led to the demise of the global financial system); E.
Scott Reckard, Criminal Probe Dropped Against Countrywide CEO Mozilo, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
2011, at A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807930.html; Amir Efrati, AIG Executives Won’t Face
Criminal Charges, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704
852004575259240428335282.html (explaining the decision by federal prosecutors not to bring
criminal charges against current and former American International Group, Inc. executives for their
role in the financial crisis). In August 2012, the DOJ announced that it would not bring criminal
charges against Goldman Sachs or any of its employees for financial fraud in connection with the
mortgage crisis, citing no “viable basis to bring a criminal prosecution.” Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth
Rappaport, U.S. Not Seeking Goldman Charges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2012, at C1.
68
One example is the now-defunct Countrywide Mortgage, absorbed by Bank of America during
the crisis. Over 105 years after its founding and numerous mergers, acquisitions, and name changes,
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The subprime mortgage crisis, in which “lenders made loans that they
knew borrowers could not afford” and in which “lenders . . . put borrowers
into higher-cost loans so [lenders] would get bigger fees, often never
disclosed to borrowers,” fueled a speculative housing bubble in which
borrowers were expected to default, causing massive losses to investors in
mortgage securities.69 Countrywide Financial originated more subprime
loans than any other company.70 The fees from the easy mortgages granted
by Countrywide yielded financial riches for Angelo Mozilo, the former
CEO of Countrywide, whose income included $102 million in 2006, a total
of $259 million in 2007, and a retirement benefit package of $58 million in
2008.71 Mozilo settled a civil suit brought by the SEC for $67.5 million, in
which Mozilo and two other Countrywide executives were accused of
misleading investors, but no criminal charges were brought.72
Countrywide, once valued with assets of $200 billion, was acquired by
Bank of America in 2008, then valued at $2.8 billion.73
Executives at the financial firms made millions in salary, perks, fees,
and bonuses, while many of the companies they commanded yielded
negative shareholder returns.74 Nearly $17 trillion in household net wealth
Bank of America had assets of $2.3 trillion in September 2009, absorbing both Countrywide and
Merrill Lynch after the 2008 global financial meltdown. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13
BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 180 (2010). Indeed,
in March 2009, Bank of America’s assets were 16.4% of GDP. Id. at 1, 12.
69
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii.
70
Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 24 (2009) [hereinafter Lessons from the Subprime Debacle]; see also STEVEN A.
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF
LAW 192 (2012) [hereinafter LAWLESS CAPITALISM].
71
Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 25. For 2006, Mozilo’s
compensation included salary plus a bonus of $20.5 million; in 2007, he earned $102 million in salary,
$30 million in options compensation, and $127 million in sales of Countrywide stock, which were sold
immediately prior to the firm’s announcement of a $388 million write down due to loan losses.
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 192.
72
Morgenson, supra note 20; see also RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 192;
Nocera, supra note 67 (“On the eve of the trial date last fall, the S.E.C. blinked and settled with Mr.
Mozilo. One of the S.E.C.’s charges was insider trading—that Mr. Mozilo sold nearly $140 million
worth of stock after he knew the company was in trouble.”); Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime
Debacle, supra note 70, at 24 (detailing the civil suit brought by eleven states for over $8 billion on the
grounds that Countrywide misled consumers and actively lied about its “no closing cost loans”).
73
Countrywide Financial Corporation, supra note 20.
74
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns
and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272–73 (2010) (analyzing the net financial payoff
for Bear Stearns and Lehman executive teams during 2000–2008 and concluding that “performance
based compensation” more than made up for paper losses from exposing the firms to high risk
investments); Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing the
distorted consequences of risk-taking conduct by CEOs that leads to high financial payoffs in executive
compensation “while offloading staggering risks” of losses onto the corporation and the global
economy); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Investment Bankers’ Culture of Ownership? 4–5, 18–20
(Aug. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664520 (reviewing
executive compensation structure of the CEOs for the fourteen largest firms involved in the U.S.
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vanished in the financial crisis, while over two dozen emergency programs
were implemented “to stabilize the financial system and to rescue specific
firms.”75 The Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, in
assuring an audience that the Justice Department was still investigating the
crisis, recently defended the lack of criminal prosecutions against banking
and financial executives, by suggesting that “unethical and irresponsible
[conduct,] . . . while morally reprehensible—may not necessarily have
been criminal.”76 Morally reprehensible conduct, however, tends to be
sanctioned by criminal law, particularly fraud.
The Justice Department appears to be operating under a new policy
because even in the very recent past, business leaders went to jail despite a
business-friendly administration. Most notably, President George W.
Bush’s Administration addressed fraud by imposing prison sentences. 77

financial crisis during 2008—the U.S. Treasury-required TARP participants, Bank of America, Bank of
New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Wells
Fargo, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide Financial, and AIG—and
concluding that the compensation structures created financial incentives for executive risk-taking that
resulted in positive payoffs for the CEOs from 2000–2008, while the investor shareholders experienced
negative returns); see, e.g., M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive
Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2007) (finding that backdating options result in losses
of $400 million per firm while executives gained $500,000).
75
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 375–76, 391 (In addition to TARP, included among the
programs are the Federal Reserve’s Term Securities Lending Facility and Primary Dealer Credit
Facility programs, at $483 billion and $156 billion, respectively; money market funding peaked at $350
billion, Commercial Paper Funding Facility peaked at $365 billion; and the Federal Reserve’s purchase
of agency mortgage-backed securities of $1.25 trillion.). Household net wealth decreased from the
decline in housing prices, as well as from the declining value of financial assets. Id. at 391; see also
Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put,” Presidential Politics, and
the Global Financial Meltdown, Part I: From Shadow Financial System to Shadow Bailout, 38 INT’L J.
POL. ECON. 3 (2009) (analyzing the origins of the global financial meltdown in the U.S. subprime
mortgage markets and the proliferation of extensive financial risk by Wall Street); Ramirez, Lessons
from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 70, at 1 (arguing that, among other factors, “[c]orporate
governance in the United States played a central role in the historic subprime debacle now gripping the
global economy” (footnote omitted)).
76
Peter Lattman, Holder Defends Efforts to Fight Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb.
23, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/holder-defends-efforts-to-combatfinancial-fraud/.
77
See, e.g., Kamelia Angelova, Top 10 White-Collar Criminals in Jail, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 16,
2009, 2:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/white-collar-criminals-in-jail-2009-7 (listing the
executives of major corporations that are serving prison sentences for fraud and embezzlement).
Former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, convicted of false financial reporting and fraud, is serving
twenty-five years; former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling, convicted on securities fraud and other crimes,
has an expected release date from federal prison of 2028. Id. Former HealthSouth Corp. founder and
CEO Richard M. Scrushy served a seventy-month sentence for a 2006 conviction for paying $500,000
in campaign contributions in exchange for a hospital regulatory board seat. Sophia Pearson, ExHealthSouth Chief Scrushy’s Prison Term Cut to 70 Months, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 25,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-26/ex-healthsouth-chief-scrushy-s-prison-termcut-to-70-months.html. Former Tyco International CEO Dennis Kozlowski is serving a ninety-eight
month to twenty-five year prison term for a 2005 accounting fraud conviction. Kozlowski in NYC Work
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, as well as Congress, found
evidence of fraud and made referrals to the Justice Department.78 This
Article maintains that given the enormous costs of the crisis, the DOJ’s
timidity toward pursuing prosecutions is simply inexplicable.79 The
continued failure to impose criminal sanctions affirms white-collar
misconduct, threatening to lay the seeds for the next crisis.
III. DISCRETION AND THE PROSECUTOR
The nature of criminal law is such that it is impossible to define rules
to cover every possible combination of facts that might be defined as
criminal.80 Indeed, scholars have long recognized that legal systems
compromise between the certainty of rules and the discretion of
“informed” officials based upon particular facts.81 Consequently, the
prosecutor is given broad discretion in making criminal charging
decisions.82 “So long as there is probable cause to support the charges,
prosecutors can decide how many counts to bring, the severity of the crime
to charge, and which suspects to use as witnesses and which to charge as
defendants.”83 Many factors impact the prosecutor’s decision. Some
factors are explicit and are often set forth in prosecutorial guidelines,
Release, N.Y. POST (Mar. 15, 2012, 12:07 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/kozlowski_in
_nyc_work_release_CzB8HN8Nldrmqy2Y7VNZ3K.
78
See Phil Angelides, Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at A25
(reporting that both the FCIC and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations referred
potential violations to the Justice Department—for example, the FCIC report contains evidence about
Clayton Holdings—yet, while others have relied on this evidence to support claims of fraud and
misrepresentation, the Justice Department has failed to devote appropriate resources or attention to this
case or others, which is in stark contrast to the massive efforts to address the savings-and-loan debacle
of the late 1980s); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 169–70, 187 (detailing the Commission’s
analysis of fraud by the corporate executives leading to the financial crisis and its conclusion that the
firms securitizing mortgages violated due diligence).
79
See, e.g., Interview by Chris Martenson with Gretchen Morgenson, Columnist, N.Y. Times,
(Mar. 23, 2012), available at http://www.chrismartenson.com/blog/gretchen-morgenson-wall-streetreally-does-enjoy-different-set-rules-rest-us/72774 (“There were 1,100 criminal referrals in the S&L
crisis and there were 839 convictions. That is a sizable number and far, far, far more than we have
seen. I mean I think I can name one senior level person at a mortgage company who is in jail at the
moment.” (quoting Gretchen Morgenson)).
80
See MORAN & COOPER, supra note 12, at 10 (“It is now firmly believed by those who work in
the process, and by those who observe it, that strict adherence to the rules of law, precisely as they are
narrowly laid down, certainly as it relates to the criminal law, would be socially intolerable. This is to
say that society, not the criminal justice system, would not stand for full enforcement of the laws. Here
is clearly a basis for a high degree of discretion in the process.” (footnote omitted)).
81
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (1961).
82
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 680 (4th ed. 2004) (“The notion that the
prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when
not to is firmly entrenched in American law.”).
83
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 29
(2008); see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (holding that prosecutors are not required
to charge a defendant with the most lenient statute).
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ethical rules, or court opinions; others are implicit, possibly even
unrecognized, factors, such as racial bias, relationships among supervisors
and suspects, or the socioeconomic status of the offender and her perceived
ability to finance a defense.84 These latter implicit factors are often not
readily identifiable in a particular instance (although a bias may be
discernible), but the explicit factors provide easy cover for any decision a
prosecutor might make. When wealth or power are implicit factors
discouraging prosecution, a prosecutor cannot ignore the affirmance effect.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Every prosecutor must consider the sufficiency of the evidence in
assessing whether a crime should be charged and what crime can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Depending upon the size of a particular
prosecutor’s office, charging guidelines may be expressly stated or
informally applied, but these constraints are not typically statutorily
bound.85 Further, because the probable cause standard required to charge a
crime is lower than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard required
to convict a defendant charged with a crime, prosecutors may vary
considerably in their charging models. Three decision-making models that
have been identified as governing prosecutorial choices along the charging
continuum are the legal sufficiency model, the trial sufficiency model, and
the system efficiency model.86
Prosecutors fitting the legal sufficiency model make charging
decisions based upon the minimum level of proof necessary to meet the
elements of the crime charged.87 The success of this model relies upon the
expectation that many cases will resolve in a plea bargain before trial, and
thus will not be tested by the high burden of proving the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.88 The risk of a type II error, that is, proceeding
with a criminal charge when the defendant is not guilty, is highest with this
model.89 The costs of such an error are borne by the defendant to a large

84
See id. at 30–32 (describing the relevant factors when prosecutors are deciding whether to bring
a case, such as economic realities, the defendant’s background, and the strengths of each case).
85
See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND
ADJUDICATION 135−36, 143 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that prosecutors usually have the most important
voice in determining what charges to select, among other factors such as criminal codes and policies
and procedures of the particular office).
86
See Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors, in THE PROSECUTOR 75, 82−86
(William F. McDonald ed., 1979) (describing four prosecutorial models, including Legal Sufficiency,
System Efficiency, and Trial Sufficiency).
87
Id. at 82.
88
See id. at 82−83 (noting that with the Legal Sufficiency policy, prosecutors want to maximize
plea bargaining due to the overload of the court with less serious misdemeanor cases).
89
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics states:
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extent (e.g., cost of defense, potential loss of reputation or employment,
and loss of liberty if the defendant is convicted at trial or agrees to plea
bargain to gain a discount in punishment), but also by the public generally
(e.g., cost of prosecuting and punishing the wrong person, failure to
identify, prosecute, and punish the actual wrongdoer, or undermining
support for the rule of law).
Prosecutors employing a trial sufficiency model evaluate cases more
closely to assess the weight of evidence and the likelihood of success at
trial.90 This more cautious approach promotes a high rate of success for
the prosecutor, in that only those cases that are likely to result in conviction
are charged.91 Here, the risk of a type I error is greatest in that an early
decision not to charge risks leaving the guilty unchallenged and
unpunished.92 Inevitably, prosecutors screening cases with a view toward
trial sufficiency are less likely to pursue those whose guilt is more difficult
to prove.93
The third model, system efficiency, falls in the middle of the
continuum, relying on early screening to weed out difficult cases of proof,
yet incorporating a strong dose of plea bargaining to some degree less than
the legal sufficiency model.94 This mixed model is often employed in
urban communities where prosecutors face heavy caseloads.95 Plea
bargaining facilitates system efficiency, but at the inherent cost of those

There are two types of mistakes that can be made when deciding whether or not to
accept a hypothesis. A type I error is rejecting a true hypothesis, that is, when there
is really no good reason for rejecting. A type II error is accepting a false hypothesis,
that is, accepting it as true when it should really have been rejected. When
hypothesis testing there is a trade-off between the two types of error. The best
combination to choose depends on the losses arising from making the two types of
error; in economic decisions these are frequently asymmetrical.
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics, available at http://www.enotes.com/econ-encyclopedia/typeand-ii-errors (last visited Aug. 16, 2011); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error,
Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99 (1989) (explaining that type
I errors denote when “truly guilty defendants escape liability” and type II errors describe those in which
“truly innocent defendants are found liable”).
90
Jacoby, supra note 86, at 92, 94.
91
Id. at 90; see U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.220(A) (“The attorney for the
government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s
conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to
obtain and sustain a conviction . . . .”); Jeffrey B. Bumgarner, Community-Related Correlates to
Prosecutorial Decisions Regarding Accidental Killers: An Examination of Child Hyperthermia
Automobile Deaths 2003–2006, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 679, 681 (2008) (“[T]he trial sufficiency model . . .
is often adopted by federal prosecutors in the United States Attorney[s’] offices.”).
92
Supra note 89; see Jacoby, supra note 86, at 87 (“[T]he Trial Sufficiency policy . . . logically
should result in a substantial rejection rate at intake . . . .”).
93
See Jacoby, supra note 86, at 87.
94
Bumgarner, supra note 86, at 681.
95
Id.
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with less bargaining power (the poor and marginalized) and to the inherent
benefit of those with more status and resources.96
In affirming white-collar crimes committed by the rich or powerful,
sufficiency of evidence is a likely place to hang the prosecutor’s discretion
hat. If a corporation is involved, there may be many actors who have
touched on a part of the activities, for example, either making relevant
decisions or approving those decisions.97 The complicated relationships of
a large corporation regarding who has the authority to hire, fire, promote,
and compensate the various actors assures that an investigation into
potentially fraudulent activity will also require the time and resourceconsuming tasks of assessing whether all of the actors conspired to breach
the law, whether some actors recognized that their activities supported
lawlessness, or whether all actors believed their conduct was lawful
because it was approved by others who held expertise and should have
been expected to alert them of likely misconduct.98 Communicating this
complexity and cutting through it to present a case to a jury takes skill,
patience, and resources.99
Complexity in financial transactions complicates both the investigation
and any eventual jury trial. The prosecution’s ability to locate evidence of
wrongdoing may require sorting through thousands of documents and
hundreds of witnesses in numerous locations.100 Once pieced together, the
prosecutor must organize the information in a cohesive and straightforward manner to a jury to gain a conviction.101 Moreover, for lower96
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1924, 1935 (1992) (discussing efficiencies that incentivize prosecutors to conduct plea bargains);
Michael W. Smith, Making the Innocent Guilty: Plea Bargaining and the False Plea Convictions of the
Innocent, 46 CRIM L. BULL. 965, 968–69, 974–76 (2010) (discussing judicial and prosecutorial
identification of system efficiencies as a benefit of plea bargaining, and identifying “less objective
elements” influencing plea bargaining, such as the “race of the defendant and the victim,” the “socioeconomic and immigration status of the defendant,” and “whether the defendant is represented by a
public defender or private attorney,” among others).
97
See RICHARD D. HARTLEY, CORPORATE CRIME 41 (2008) (“[M]ost corporate criminal activity
involves employees at all levels and stems from existing circumstances in the corporation.”).
98
See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force
to Top Priority, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 998–99 (2010) [hereinafter Prioritzing Justice] (“[T]he
complexity of multidistrict corporate structures requires greater expertise to investigate and
analyze. . . . Moreover, the complexity of the laws that govern corporate conduct . . . require[s] legal
and financial expertise that is often not available in the typical U.S. Attorney’s Office.”).
99
See id. (arguing that the unique demands associated with investigating and prosecuting
corporate crimes warrant the creation of a dedicated Corporate Crimes Division within the DOJ).
100
See, e.g., DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 270 (2d ed. 2004) (“Corporate and finance crime cases . . . pose problems in
obtaining appropriate witness or victim cooperation. These cases may require sifting through masses of
dull and difficult-to-understand records . . . .” (citation omitted)).
101
See id. at 281–82 (suggesting that prosecutors face an inherently delicate task in undertaking
complex white-collar trials by noting that at least some studies of such cases show “jurors could not
accurately remember important . . . economic information”).
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level employees in the corporate food chain who were involved in the
misconduct, complexity adds cover to their claims that they were just
doing their jobs and were thus unaware of their complicity in criminal
conduct.102 Complexities in structured mortgage transactions typically
require expertise, such as forensic accountants or other experts, adding
another layer of resource demands and another courtroom obstacle as the
obscurity of the experts’ industry-laden language often confuses jurors and
the battle of the experts creates doubt.103
Finally, cases, such as those involving fraud, typically require a high
level of mens rea, such as knowing or intentional misrepresentation.104
The complexity in an organization, from documents to employee
relationships, can undermine successful prosecution, as the prosecutor
must often rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove the mental element
of the crime.105
B. Case-Specific, Non-Sufficiency Factors
In addition to sufficiency considerations informing the discretion of
prosecutors, several case-specific and defendant-specific factors impact the
decision-making process. Prosecutors consider the nature of the crime; the
gravity of the offense; the history of the defendant, including the
defendant’s age, background, and prior offenses or contact with law
enforcement; economic realities, such as administrative costs and other
available resources; the need for the defendant’s cooperation; the impact

102
See HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 71 (stating that complexities in corporate operations may
provide insulation from scrutiny because they make it “difficult to determine which actions were
deliberately undertaken”).
103
See, e.g., Linda Sandler et al., JPMorgan, Citigroup Helped Doom Lehman, Report Says,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ab1XUyb
pK4Vg (reporting that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy examiner spent a year and $38 million
producing a 2200-page bankruptcy report); see also Jean Eaglesham & Liz Rappaport, Lehman Probe
Stalls; Chance of No Charges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the SEC is doubtful it
will be able to bring charges against Lehman Brothers and that the DOJ is unlikely to pursue criminal
charges if the SEC does not move forward); Greg Farrell, Justice Department Ends Two-Year Criminal
Probe into AIG, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2010, at 23 (reporting that the DOJ determined there was
insufficient evidence to pursue charges against AIG or its senior executives).
104
See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Charles K. Whitebread, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail Fraud
and Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.05
(Otto Obermaier & Robert Morvillo eds., 2011).
105
J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 1.02B (3d ed. 2011); see also
Reckard, supra note 67 (contasting simple “cook the books” accounting fraud cases such as Enron with
Countrywide’s activity where “blame could be assigned to an entire chain of players: mortagage
brokers who falsified applications; investment bankers who concocted complex and ‘opaque’ mortgage
bonds; rating firms that provided high ratings on the bonds but said they were lied to; and institutional
investors that relied on dubious ratings because the securities carried above-market interest while
promising to be risk-free”).
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on victims, law enforcement, and the community; and punishment goals.106
Considerations of mercy,107 excuse,108 or justification109 may also persuade
a prosecutor to decline prosecution rather than risk acquittal or jury
nullification.
Some of these factors tend to favor the elite white-collar offender. The
nature of financial crimes involves no overt violence, so direct harm is
financial, not physical. The history of such offenders and their ties to the
community typically feature well-educated, middle-aged suspects with no
criminal felony record who are often pillars of their communities—active
in charitable organizations and generous with the resources of the
corporate entities they run.110 They are gainfully employed (unless they

106
F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent:
The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 194–96
(2002) (noting that prosecutorial consideration is given to the nature and gravity of a crime, the
defendant’s personal characteristics and criminal history, the victim’s wishes, and punishment goals);
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533–35
(1970) (noting prosecutorial consideration given to administrative costs, limitations in enforcement
resources, and the potential for the defendant to cooperate as an informant, among other factors).
107
See Bumgarner, supra note 86, at 689–90 (observing that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to decline prosecution in favor of mercy could be an agent of goodness when there is a
sympathetic offender, such as in cases where a parent has accidentally killed a child and deterrence is
an insufficient reason to punish).
108
Excuse defenses may be raised by defendants in cases where the prosecution is able to
establish all elements of the criminal offense, however, “conviction is deemed inappropriate because of
a lack of responsibility on the part of the defendant.” LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 109, at 447–
48; see also Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1523 (1992) (“Satisfaction of the culpable
conduct requirement creates a defeasible presumption that the defendant was morally culpable for his
crime. But, the defendant can defeat this presumption of moral fault by denying that he was morally
responsible for engaging in the culpable conduct . . . .”). Excuse defenses include insanity,
intoxication, infancy, and duress. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 109, at 448, 450.
109
Justification defenses, such as self-defense or necessity, are raised when the harm caused by
the defendant “is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal
interest.” 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 24(a) (1984); cf. Anthony M. Dillof,
Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1599 (2002) (arguing that
justification defenses should not be available to actors who engage in harmful conduct without
knowledge that the conduct was objectively justified); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the
Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32
UCLA L. REV. 61, 63–64 (1984) (critiquing justification constructs advanced by George Fletcher as too
rigid to properly account for “important moral gradations” and arguing that “justifications need not
always involve objectively right conduct”).
110
See, e.g., Russell Hubbard, Scrushy’s Charitable Donations Continue as Trial Approaches,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.al.com/specialreport/birminghamnews/in
dex.ssf?healthsouth/healthsouth146.html (reporting on the potential influence in the Alabama
community of the millions of dollars given by the Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation,
including contributions to thirty-eight organizations during 2003, when its founder (the former CEO of
HealthSouth Corp.) was facing a jury trial on eighty-five criminal counts). Scrushy was acquitted of
the accounting fraud charges in 2005, but convicted in 2006 of paying $500,000 in campaign
contributions to then-Alabama governor Don Siegelman for a seat on a hospital regulatory board.

2013]

CRIMINAL AFFIRMANCE

891

have been asked to resign), and may be able to marshal significant personal
resources—and often corporate resources111—for their defense. If the
financial scheme in question was complicated, law enforcement may
require the cooperation of the defendant to unravel the scheme to restore
order and potentially provide restitution to as many victims as possible.112
All of these factors may weigh heavily in favor of declining prosecution
and choosing non-criminal alternatives.
As discussed above, investigations and prosecutions of elite crimes are
often resource-intensive.113 The decision to pursue a single case may take
years to investigate, incur thousands of dollars in expenses, consume
weeks of court time, and yield uncertain results due to the high burden of
proof and complexity of issues and evidence.114 Consequently, the
economic reality is often that pursuing an elite crime may draw those
resources from dozens of other cases.115
On the other hand, the nature of the offense is often a breach of trust or
abuse of power (such as fraud), and is motivated by greed or power rather
than need or misfortune. More importantly, the gravity of the harm and the
impact on the community can be extensive. When Enron finally collapsed
under the weight of its criminal conduct, it had caused power outages in
Northern California,116 emptied pension funds,117 and decimated the
Scrushy was resentenced to seventy months imprisonment for that crime in January 2012. Pearson,
supra note 74.
111
See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Forest Chief Prevails Over U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, at B1
(reporting that Forest Labs’ CEO enlisted the aid of the corporation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Trade Association, among others, in
successfully convincing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to drop efforts to force his
resignation after the corporation pled guilty to misdemeanors for actions committed while he was
CEO).
112
See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 399–400 & n.219 (2003) [hereinafter Just in
Crime] (describing Michael Milken’s assistance in the bankruptcy settlement of Drexel Burnham
Lambert by unraveling the junk bond market he created while working there, and the consequent
reduction in his term of imprisonment from ten years to about twenty-two months).
113
Supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
114
Supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
115
Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2470–72 (2004) (recognizing that prosecutors may also have some personal incentives to avoid
resource-intensive criminal trials, such as lightening workloads to have personal time with families,
enhancing job successes through negotiated deals that count as wins for the government, and avoiding
the risk of losing at trial and potential associated embarrassment).
116
See, e.g., Jason Leopold, Enron Linked to California Blackouts, MARKET WATCH (May 16,
2002, 11:56 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/enron-caused-california-blackouts-traders-say
(reporting that numerous former Enron traders admitted that manipulative energy trading led to an
energy crisis in California).
117
See, e.g., Eric Berger, Feds Suing Enron Over Workers’ Pension Losses, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Feds-suingEnron-over-workers-pension-losses-2125174.php (reporting that the U.S. Labor Department was suing
Enron and its former executives for failing to properly oversee the employee pension funds while
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118

Houston community.
During the financial crisis of 2008, the global
economy crashed, unemployment sky-rocketed, and millions lost their
homes to foreclosure.119
C. Guidance on Discretionary Decision Making
The operation of federal criminal law is key to combatting complex
financial crime carried out on a nationwide or global scale. While there are
innumerable federal crimes that are relevant to white-collar crime, at its
broadest level, federal law gives federal prosecutors broad powers to
combat fraud—particularly mail fraud,120 wire fraud,121 bank fraud,122 and
securities fraud.123 The DOJ sets forth its policies in the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual for exercising prosecutorial discretion to charge or decline
prosecution.124 In those cases which meet the trial sufficiency standard, the
prosecutor may decline prosecution because: “(1) No substantial Federal
interest would be served by prosecution; (2) The person is subject to
effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) There exists an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”125
The first two considerations encompass dual sovereignty, federal
priorities, and allocation of limited resources. Although federal laws may
apply to certain crimes, and therefore may be utilized to bring defendants
to justice, often state laws also are available to prosecute offending
conduct. Dual sovereignty may permit dual prosecutions, but the DOJ has
a long-standing policy of discouraging dual prosecutions and successive
federal prosecutions where a prosecution would be based on “substantially
knowing that the Enron shares in its fund were overvalued); Steven Greenhouse, Enron’s Many
Strands: Retirement Money; Public Funds Say Losses Top $1.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/29/business/enron-s-many-strands-retirement-money-public-fundssay-losses-top-1.5-billion.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing significant losses to state
government employee pension funds that held Enron shares due to their sharp drop in value).
118
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Face Issue of How to Resolve Juror Bias Claims in the
Internet Age, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at A12 (observing that widespread harm to the Houston
economy caused by Enron’s collapse arguably made it difficult to find untainted jurors in the criminal
case against Jeffrey K. Skilling, the company’s former CEO).
119
See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xv–xvi (providing a brief synopsis of the global
financial crisis of 2008 and noting that, at the time the report went to print, approximately four million
American families had lost their homes to foreclosure and more than twenty-six million Americans
remained unemployed).
120
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
121
Id. § 1343.
122
Id. § 1344.
123
Id. § 1348; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (outlawing fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (imposing up to twenty years imprisonment for violations of rules
such as Section 10b-5).
124
See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.220(A) (describing when an attorney
for the government should commence or decline prosecution).
125
Id.
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the same act(s) or transaction(s)” unless there is “a substantial federal
interest” that is “demonstrably unvindicated” despite prior state
prosecution.126 Moreover, given the breadth of federal laws, the DOJ must
prioritize potential cases to effectively allocate limited prosecutorial
resources.127 Focusing on cases that will serve key federal interests that
have not been otherwise vindicated rations those resources. In this regard,
a listed item under the DOJ’s strategic goal to “[p]revent [c]rime, [e]nforce
[f]ederal [l]aws, and [r]epresent the [r]ights and [i]nterests of the American
[p]eople,” is the effort to “[c]ombat public and corporate corruption, fraud,
economic crime, and cybercrime.”128 Thus, despite the heavy demand of
resources to pursue corporate corruption, fraud, and economic crime, the
DOJ has identified specifically a substantial public interest in such crimefighting efforts and its role in representing the interests of the American
people. Given the cost to the American public, which was imposed due to
fraud in the financial markets during the financial crisis, the return on
investment of resources to root out criminal actors is very much in the
interests of the American people.129 Moreover, the visiblility and
widespread impact of high-profile financial frauds demands prosecutorial
attention lest their ubiquity impose the greater cost of undermining the rule
of law and thereby driving a stake in the heart of the American justice
system.
With respect to the third consideration, a number of non-criminal
alternatives to prosecution have evolved, especially in the white-collar
crime arena. Private parties may bring civil actions for tortious conduct or
126
Id. § 9-2.031(A). In addition to the above conditions, approval to move forward with a federal
prosecution requires approval by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Id. The policy is
commonly referred to as the “Petite Policy,” due to the Supreme Court’s reference to the policy in
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). Id. Although there is generally no statutory bar to
prosecuting an individual in both federal and state court for the same acts or transaction, Congress has
expressly prohibited by statute dual prosecutions where there is a “state judgment of conviction or
acquittal on the merits” for a narrow set of offenses. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1992, 2101,
2117 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-36, 1282 (2006)).
127
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 13–14, available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/mps/strategic2007-2012/goals_and_objectives.pdf (identifying three
key goals and objectives: “Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s security . . . Prevent Crime,
Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and Interests of the American People . . . [and] Ensure
the Fair and Efficient Administration of Justice”).
128
Id. at 14.
129
See supra Part I (stating that the financial crisis caused multiple bank failures, mortgage
company bankruptcies, and real estate foreclosures); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 389–401
(stating that the financial crisis led to a fall in gross domestic product (“GDP”), employment, household
net worth, real estate values, and local government tax revenues). In Part V of the FCIC Report, The
Aftershocks, the subtitles of the contents sum up the extensive impact of the financial crisis, especially
the losers and winners: Household: “I’m not eating. I’m not sleeping”; Businesses: “Squirrels storing
nuts”; Commercial real estate: “Nothing’s moving”; Government: “States struggled to close shortfalls”;
The financial sector: “Almost triple [securities industry profits over] the level of three years earlier.”
Id. at 389.
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other civil violations of law, or they may bring qui tam actions on behalf of
the government under the False Claims Act when the defendants have
defrauded the government.130 Many white-collar criminal federal statutes
provide for or have civil counterparts.131 Consequently, government agents
may choose to file civil suits rather than criminal charges.132 Many
administrative agencies have authority to press administrative proceedings
to address individual or corporate misconduct and parallel criminal
prosecutions are often possible;133 however, a skilled defense attorney may
be able to avoid such risks through a global settlement that resolves the
risk of criminal charges by using tools such as deferred prosecution or nonprosecution agreements.134 Civil asset forfeitures, state license revocation
130

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–30 (2006).
See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating that any person who is found guilty for
violating antitrust laws can be punished by fine or by imprisonment); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (2006) (providing that criminal and civil penalties
can be imposed on any person found guilty of racketeering); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006)
(imposing civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (2006) (allowing the EPA to commence civil and criminal actions if a state is not acting in
compliance with the Clean Air Act); see also United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 936–37 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing overlapping civil and criminal parallel investigations for violations of securities
laws).
132
See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5–7, 365–66 (2d ed. 2006)
(“[V]iolations of white collar criminal statutes may lead to civil and/or administrative remedies in
addition to or instead of criminal penalties.”).
133
JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 670 (3d ed. 2009); see,
e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.250(B) (describing alternatives to criminal
prosecution carried out by administrative agencies, such as “civil tax proceedings; civil actions under
the securities, customs, antitrust, or other regulatory laws; and reference of complaints to licensing
authorities or to professional organizations such as bar associations”).
134
See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach to Banks by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A1 (observing that the federal prosecutors are moving away from criminal
prosecutions in white-collar cases to lesser alternatives, such as deferred prosecutions or civil
litigation). The deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) permits a corporation to resolve a criminal
investigation by agreeing to similar terms that might be included in a corporate criminal sentence,
including terms such as restitution, fines, additional auditing measures, termination of responsible
individuals, and probation. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-22.010; see Ryan D.
McConnell et al., Plan Now or Pay Later: The Role of Compliance in Criminal Cases, 33 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 509, 557–62 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements (“NPA”) since 2002 and providing a table listing the numerous corporations
that have obtained a DPA or NPA since 2005); Steven R. Peikin, Outside Counsel; Deferred
Prosecution Agreements: Standard for Corporate Probes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, at 28 (stating that
deferred prosecution agreements “have become a standard means of resolving major corporate
investigations”); F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for
Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. CORP. L. 121, 124 (1997) (“The cases
involving Salomon Brothers, Sequa Corporation, Prudential Securities, and Coopers & Lybrand
provide useful examples of alternative dispositions of cases involving corporate defendants.”). The
DPAs offer corporations the opportunity to avoid the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction,
while offering the prosecution the opportunity to set fines and collect restitution outside the limits of
the judicial process, and the opportunity to gain the corporation’s cooperation. Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate
131
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proceedings, professional disciplinary proceedings, and self-regulatory
organization enforcement proceedings are additional alternatives (or
parallel processes) to criminal prosecution.135 Although these alternatives
obtain some measure of compensation from the wrongdoers, that
compensation may come from the corporate treasury rather than personal
funds, it may refund direct losses of those willing to take legal action but
not sanction the misconduct, or in the case of governmental civil actions, it
may impose fines without requiring admission of wrongdoing.136
Each non-criminal alternative may exact some recovery of assets from
the elites or their companies, but their personal reputations, and often their
ill-gotten riches, remain substantially intact.137 Moreover, a small portion
of the spoils may be used to further protect their interests in the form of
lobbying for preferred legislation,138 supporting favored politicians who
Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 952 (2005) [hereinafter The Science Fiction of Corporate
Criminal Liability]. Both parties benefit from resource savings. Id. at 953. In addressing general
considerations for corporate criminal liability, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states the following:
In certain instances, it may be appropriate, upon consideration of the factors set forth
herein, to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other than indictment. Nonprosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, for example, occupy an important
middle ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a
corporation. . . . Likewise, civil and regulatory alternatives may be appropriate in
certain cases . . . .
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200.
135
See ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 643–47, 676–77, 679–80 (describing those forms of
proceedings).
136
See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(issuing an order accepting settlement but criticizing the SEC’s practice of agreeing to consent
judgments that do not require defendants to admit or deny the allegations of the complaint). “Only one
thing is left certain: the public will never know whether the S.E.C.’s charges are true, at least not in a
way that they can take as established by these proceedings.” Id. at 309.
137
See Morgenson, supra note 20 (stating that Countrywide and Bank of America paid $45
million of the $67.5 million settlement by former CEO of Countrywide Financial, and it was reported
that he made $521 million during his tenure at Countrywide).
138
See PBS Frontline, The Long Demise of GlassSteagall, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html (last visited Jan.
7, 2013) (recounting efforts by Sandy Weill, then-head of Travelers Insurance Company, to lobby
Congress, the Federal Reserve, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and then-President Bill Clinton to
support and pass legislation that would repeal portions of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act that impeded an intended merger between Travelers and Citicorp, the parent company of
Citibank). In 1998 and 1999, having gained authority from the Federal Reserve to merge the
companies into Citigroup (the biggest corporate merger in history at that time) by promising to divest
itself of the Travelers insurance business within the next two years if Congress did not pass legislation
allowing Citigroup to retain the insurance business, Weill and John Reed of Citicorp intensely lobbied
for regulatory change; in the 1997–1998 election cycle, the finance, insurance, and real estate industries
targeted $150 million in political campaign donations to congressional banking committees and other
financial services committee members, and spent more than $200 million on lobbying efforts. Id.
Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 12 U.S.C. § 1811, repealing those
provisions of the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts. Id. Treasury Secretary Rubin
resigned his post to join Citigroup in October 1999 as a director and chair of Citigroup’s executive
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share their views and are willing to promote their interests, and hiring legal
teams to defend their interests before any hostile legal actions can take
hold. Given that the benefits of the elite crimes are the wealth or power
acquired, the civil alternatives further affirm the lawlessness and remind
others that the criminal law does not always penalize their misconduct.139
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual policies are intended to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, but do not create a “right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litigation with the United
States.”140 The policies may, in fact, be modified by United States
Attorneys “in the interests of fair and effective law enforcement within the
district.”141 Thus, prosecutors hold discretion in exercising discretion.
The ABA Standard for Criminal Justice offers further guidance
regarding the charging decision and is explicit in its instruction regarding
the need to allow the prosecutor broad exercise of discretion.142 ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice promotes standards for prosecutors,
addressing sufficiency, public interest, and ethical concerns in exercising
discretion.143
committee, days after the Clinton Administration agreed to support the legislation on October 22, 1999.
Id.; see also Mara Der Hovanesian, Citigroup’s Rubin Resigns, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 9,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jan2009/db2009019_851357.htm (noting
that Rubin reportedly earned about $115 million in his advisory role over the ten years with Citigroup).
139
See Bob Van Voris, Goldman’s Tourre Travels to Rwanda While Awaiting Trial, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-23/goldman-s-tourre-travels-to-rwandawhile-awaiting-trial.html (reporting that Fabrice Tourre, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. executive director,
is a defendant in a federal case in New York in which he is accused of defrauding investors in a
collateralized debt obligation known as Abacus 2007-AC1, while Goldman Sachs settled claims for
$550 million). Public offerings are seldom a one-man show. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm
(reporting that Goldman agreed to a civil settlement without admitting or denying allegations, where
$250 million will be distributed to harmed investors and $300 million will be paid to the U.S.
Treasury); Press Release, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs Reports Earnings Per
Common Share of $13.18 for 2010 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/mediarelations/press-releases/current/pdfs/2010-q4-earnings.pdf (reporting net revenues of $39.16 billion and
net earnings of $8.35 billion for the year ending December 31, 2010).
140
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.150. The manual explains further that the
principles have been “developed purely as [a] matter of internal Departmental policy and [are] being
provided to Federal prosecutors solely for their own guidance in performing their duties.” Id.
141
Id. § 9-27.140 (requiring approval by the Assistant Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General if there is “[a]ny significant modification or departure contemplated as a matter of policy or
regular practice”).
142
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-3.9(a)–(d) (3d ed. 1993) (describing the standards for charging discretion).
143
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at 3-3.9(a)–(d) provides the following:
(a) “A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction.”
(b) A prosecutor “may . . . for good cause consistent with the public interest decline
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One ABA standard implicitly imports affirmance considerations in that
it permits declining prosecution “for good cause consistent with the public
interest.”144 By recognizing that public interest considerations rightly
factor into exercising discretion, the ABA standards implicitly support
affirmance considerations, but fail affirmatively to call attention to them.
The public interest in having an equitable rule of law, applicable to all, is
central to democratic ideals. Thus, while sufficiency of evidence alone
may not require prosecution, the public interest is undermined in instances
where it would appear that by failing to prosecute, the government is
affirming conduct imposing great harm on society through lawlessness by
the favored wealthy and powerful. Permitting those few to reap great
rewards from their criminality, while imposing such oppressive harm on
society, creates a moral hazard of repeated lawlessness by that group while
undermining the rule of law to all. The public has a deep, abiding interest
in decisions declining to investigate or prosecute elite crime. 145
Prosecutors, thus, are ethically bound to consider affirmance because it is
central to the public’s interest.
D. Plea Bargaining
Prosecutorial discretion extends to whether to settle a case pursuant to
a plea bargain. The prosecutor has discretion to offer a plea, but that
discretion is limited in that acceptance of the plea is subject to court
approval.146 Resolving a case through a plea agreement may leave some
feeling that the government could do more.147 Given the uncertainty
inherent in trial litigation, if the outcome of the trial is anything less than
guilty (e.g., a hung jury or an acquittal), the government has lost the
opportunity to recover any part of the losses, and in the case of a mistrial,
to prosecute, notwithstanding . . . sufficient evidence” to support a conviction.
(c) “A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a
case in which he or she [the prosecutor] has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
accused.”
(d) A “prosecutor should give no weight to personal or political advantages or
disadvantages” that the prosecutor may be subjected to or which may “enhance his
or her record of convictions.”
Id.
144

Id. at 3-3.9(b).
See Morgenson & Story, supra note 134 (reporting on declinations policies in the DOJ);
Taibbi, supra note 66 (same).
146
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (stating that “the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or
defer a decision”).
147
See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Ex-EPA Official Faults Probe of BP Alaska Oil Spill, WALL ST. J., Nov.
19, 2008, at A6 (reporting on former FBI special agent in charge of investigation of two British
Petreuleum (“BP”) oil spills in 2006, and his concern that the investigation had been quashed midinvestigation by the DOJ after BP agreed to plead to a misdemeanor and a substantially lower fine than
recommended by the EPA to settle the charges).
145
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the government would have to assess whether a retrial is available and
worth the additional resources given the outcome of the first trial. Even if
the government wins at trial, the defendant could delay the outcome
through appeals. Negotiated deals yield certainty and finality while
conserving limited resources.148 Moreover, the resolution is usually
considered a “win” for the government.
Defendants may consider such resolutions a “win” too. A settlement
diminishes costly litigation expenditures. Moreover, an agreement may
eliminate the ability for private litigants to use a criminal conviction as a
basis for civil litigation recovery, since the government may resolve the
criminal cases without requiring an admission of guilt.149 Otherwise, a
148
One of the oft-cited purposes of a plea agreement is to provide certainty. See MORAN &
COOPER, supra note 12, at 60 (stating that when a “prosecutor negotiates a deal with an accused, he is
actually invoking the right of the court to sentence a convicted person”). Another justification for plea
agreements is a mutually beneficial exchange in terms of lesser charge bargaining or sentencing
bargaining for the defendant and conservation of resources for the government. For example, the U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual provides:

The basic policy is that charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the
prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government’s ability readily to prove a
charge for legal or evidentiary reasons. There are, however, two exceptions.
First, if the applicable guideline range from which a sentence may be imposed
would be unaffected, readily provable charges may be dismissed or dropped as part
of a plea bargain. . . .
Second, federal prosecutors may drop readily provable charges with the specific
approval of the United States Attorney or designated supervisory level official for
reasons set forth in the file of the case. This exception recognizes that the aims of
the Sentencing Reform Act must be sought without ignoring other, critical aspects of
the Federal criminal justice system. For example, approvals to drop charges in a
particular case might be given because the United States Attorney’s office is
particularly over-burdened, the case would be time-consuming to try, and
proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the total number of cases disposed of
by the office.
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.400 (emphasis added). One key difficulty in
prosecuting white-collar crimes is that the evidence to support such charges is often found by piecing
together information gleaned from hundreds of documents, emails, invoices, and interviews. See
Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 527–28 (2004) (discussing the difficulty in detection of criminal activity,
the complexity of financial records, and the comparatively overwhelming resources of corporate
conglomerates as compared to government resources to fight corporate crime); Ramirez, Prioritizing
Justice, supra note 98, at 1007–08 (proposing a Corporate Crimes Division of the DOJ to centralize
expertise and resources necessary to address complex litigation associated with corporate and whitecollar criminality). Thus, the hallmark of a white-collar crime case is that it will be time consuming to
try. When compared to a simple drug bust or violent offense that can be tried in a day or disposed of
by plea agreement without dropping charges, most major corporate and white-collar crime prosecutions
are likely to reduce significantly the total number of cases disposed by the office. Thus, this exception
has the potential to swallow the rule. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200
(suggesting that it may at times be appropriate to resolve a corporate criminal case by means other than
indictment).
149
If the parties are in agreement and the court is amenable, this can be accomplished in several
ways depending upon the jurisdiction, such as through a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea (where
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criminal conviction could preclude retrial on factual issues in subsequent
civil cases, since the burden of proof in a civil trial is always less than the
“guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof required in a criminal
trial. Because private civil litigation may expose defendants to great
losses, defendants have powerful incentives to force plaintiffs to meet their
burden of proof on all elements of their claims. Resolving litigation early
in an investigation, moreover, will likely lead to halting or limiting the
government’s investigation. Thus, private litigants will not only be unable
to use the “guilty” outcome of a criminal trial to their advantage, but they
will also have to bear the costs of any additional investigation of the
wrongdoing. If the government loses the criminal trial, the defendant
cannot use the verdict against private litigants because the burden of proof
is lower in civil trials.
Although a plea is often superior to declination in terms of expressing
community disapproval,150 criminal prosecution is the most powerful tool
permitted), or a global civil settlement that resolves the criminal charges. North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (stating that a court may accept a guilty plea where the defendant maintains
innocence, provided there is strong evidence of actual guilt, a strong factual basis for criminal charge,
the defendant was advised by competent counsel, and the defendant intelligently concluded that he
should plead guilty to second degree murder to avoid risk of death penalty if convicted for first degree
murder); Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 134, at 950 n.100
(describing the use of global settlements to resolve criminal, civil, and regulatory violations).
150
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual offers instruction for plea bargaining. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-27.430 (providing that with certain narrow exceptions, when a
prosecution is concluded pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor should require the defendant to
plead guilty to a charge “[t]hat is the most serious readily provable charge consistent with the nature
and extent of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct”). The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations also directs federal prosecutors to “seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable
offense charged.” Id. § 9-28.1300; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations § XIII (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; see also Press Release 06-828, Dep’t of
Justice, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting
Corp. Fraud (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/December/06_odag_828.
html (explaining the McNulty Memorandum policy change and what factors prosecutors should
consider when charging fraud).
Another possibility is that charges are brought against or a plea is negotiated with a corporate
entity associated with the parent entity, but the plea grossly understates the criminality or underpunishes because it includes a relatively meager fine, requires a non-participating subsidiary to enter a
plea rather than the initial corporate target, or includes additional misconduct as covered in the plea for
which no charges are filed. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, HCA to Pay $95 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at C1 (reporting that “[a]lthough the [fraudulent] practices involve widespread
criminal actions in HCA’s hospital system, the guilty pleas will be formally entered by two inactive
subsidiaries”). By permitting the subsidiaries to plead guilty, HCA avoided debarment from
government contracting, which would have effectively put the corporation out of business. Id.; see also
Amy Schofield & Linda Weaver, Health Care Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 621 (2000)
(describing provisions applicable to healthcare providers and suppliers that could lead to exclusion or
debarment from federally funded programs); Ken Ward, Jr., Massey Firm to Plead Guilty in Mine
Deaths, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 23, 2008 (reporting on global settlement by Massey Energy Co.
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society has to address very costly antisocial behavior.
E. Ambiguity in Declination Obscures Implicit Motivations
“[T]he power to be lenient is the power to discriminate.”151 Given the
vast numbers of crimes that are available to charge, “the substantive
criminal law amounts to ‘an arsenal of weapons to be used against such
persons as the police or prosecutor may deem to be a menace to public
safety.’”152 The standards described above were developed to guide the
prosecutor’s discretion but tend to focus on circumstances discouraging the
prosecutor from abusing prosecutorial power by prosecuting upon less than
sufficient evidence. Nonetheless, “there are—as a practical matter—no
comparable checks upon his discretionary judgment of whether or not to
prosecute one against whom sufficient evidence exists.”153 Moreover, such
discretionary power may hinge “unjustifiably on the relative weakness or
strength of the networks to which perpetrator and victim belong.”154 Little
guidance or limits exist regarding a decision to refrain from prosecuting
the powerful.
1. Unlimited Discretion to Decline Prosecution
Prosecutors are permitted to forge forward with virtually no limit on
their discretion not to charge since the party not charged will not challenge
the decision, and parties favoring charges against another generally lack
standing to raise the issue in litigation.155 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized prosecutorial freedom in exercising discretion, placing limits
on that discretion in extremely limited circumstances.156 Indeed, the only
parties able and available to challenge charging decisions are those who
challenge their own charges by claiming an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion to charge a crime: vindictive prosecution in violation of due

that resolved over 1300 violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act at Massey energy
subsidiaries).
151
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 683.
152
Id. (quoting Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42
YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1932)).
153
Id. at 685; see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (stating that court
oversight in prosecutorial discretion delays proceedings, chills law enforcement, and undermines
prosecutorial effectiveness); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982) (“A prosecutor
should remain free before trial to exercise the broad direction entrusted to him to determine the extent
of the societal interest in prosecution.”).
154
Holmes, supra note 13, at 126.
155
See, e.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying standing of victims to
challenge plea).
156
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that “a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of
the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
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process or selective or discriminatory enforcement in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.158 Beyond such specific and identifiable
instances of review of prosecutorial discretion for violations of
constitutional protections, courts have identified the separation of powers
doctrine in declining to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.159 The
Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance toward further inquiry because
“[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s
relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.”160 Mandamus is thus deemed an inappropriate remedy in this
context because of the longstanding acceptance of the notion that a
prosecutor has discretion in deciding when to prosecute.
157
See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 379–80 (affording prosecutors wide latitude in reevaluating
charging decisions, even after defendant has exercised his constitutional right to request a jury trial);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (finding no presumption of vindictiveness when
prosecutor threatens to increase charges if defendant rejects plea offer); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 28–29 (1974) (presuming vindictive prosecution where state responded to defendant’s successful
exercise of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial
de novo).
158
See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610 (stating that discretion is broad, but not unfettered; the
defendant must show not just the discriminatory effect but also the discriminatory purpose of
punishment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (holding that a defendant may
demonstrate that prosecutorial discretion of a law is “directed so exclusively against a particular class
of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive [that it effects] a practical denial” of equal
protection of the law).
159
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 686–87; see, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 960
(10th Cir. 2008) (declining to review prosecutorial discretion in deciding to prosecute Native
Americans and power companies differently); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)
(“[T]he courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”). Reliance on the separation of powers
reasoning as a justification for refusing to interfere in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion has been
criticized by some scholars for ignoring the many Supreme Court decisions claiming entitlement to
judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion, and for accepting that prosecution is exclusively
an executive function. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
210 (1969) (criticizing the court’s reasoning in United States v. Cox, and observing that “more than a
hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and three-quarters will have to be found
contrary to the Constitution” if the judiciary is barred from reviewing executive decisions); Rebecca
Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 1, 12–13 (2009) (criticizing judicial review of executive discretion because it does not
comport with the separation of powers doctrine in Administrative Law); see also Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1994)
(explaining that historical accounts suggest that the U.S. Constitution did not compel exclusive
executive control over prosecutors).
160
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. In Wayte, the Court further elaborated on its conviction that “the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. . . . Judicial supervision in this area . . .
entails systematic costs of particular concern.” Id. The Court stated that: “Examining the basis of a
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the
prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.” Id.
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2. Networks and Revolving Doors
One cannot ignore the impact of the “revolving door” of private
business leaders who cycle through government leadership positions and
back into private businesses after relatively short terms.161 Prosecutors,
like most government agents, do not expect to spend their entire careers in
the government sector. If one is a political appointee, the length of service
is marked, and the employee may wish to return to a prior position or move
forward into the private sector utilizing their government service-gained
expertise. Conflict-of-interest rules may place some restraints on the
employee or former employee.162 Often such rules have a limited time
period,163 but they will not invariably provide the transparency necessary
for public confidence, especially when the discretionary activities
encompass a broad range of considerations, as is true of prosecutorial
discretion.164 Moreover, if government leaders choose to appoint industry
leaders who may have violated the laws they are now hired to oversee, it is
difficult to believe that such employees will not consider their own risk of
liability in making decisions about pursuing regulatory investigations or
recommending actions against other industry actors who engaged in
conduct similar to the appointee.165
161
See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 141–43 (2009) (reviewing a history of
revolving door appointments from the banking industry, including the two ethics waivers Henry
Paulson received as Treasury Secretary, allowing him to participate in matters affecting Goldman
Sachs, his former employer).
162
See, e.g., Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Hid Its Lawyer’s Madoff Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the SEC’s Inspector General referred the actions taken by
the SEC’s general counsel David M. Becker—including recommending a compensation plan for the
victims of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme that was favorable to Becker’s personal interests in an
inheritance from a Madoff account—to the DOJ); Edward Wyatt, Ex-Official at S.E.C. Settles Case for
$50,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at B3 (reporting that Spencer Barasch, former enforcement
director for the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional office from 1998 to 2005, who was accused of discoursing
or blocking three investigations into the alleged Ponzi scheme by Stanford Financial Group during his
SEC tenure, agreed to a civil fine for violating federal conflict-of-interest rules by later representing
Stanford Financial Group before the Commission); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Off. of Pub. Affairs
(U.S.A.O. E.D. Tex.), Former SEC Head of Enforcement for the Fort Worth Office Settles Conflict of
Interest Allegations (Jan. 13, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/usao/txe/News/2012/edtx-barasch011312.html (reporting that Spencer Barasch entered into a settlement offer to pay $50,000 dollars for
his representation of Stanford Financial Group despite a permanent conflict of interest).
163
President Obama extended the timeframe from one year to two years. See Paltrow, supra note
8 (reporting that the extended two year conflict-of-interest period for U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder and DOJ Criminal Division Chief Lanny Breuer expired in spring 2011).
164
See, e.g., id. (reporting that while U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and DOJ Criminal
Division Chief Lanny Breuer were partners at Covington & Burling, the firm’s clients included Bank of
America, Citigroup, JPMorganChase, Wells Fargo, and Freddie Mac, and that the firm provided legal
opinion letters needed to create MERS; moreover, in 2010, both Holder’s and Breuer’s chiefs-of-staff
returned to Covington).
165
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Revolving Door at S.E.C. Is Hurdle to Crisis Cleanup, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/revolving-door-at-s-e-c-is-hurdle-to-
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3. Unaccountable Discretion
Prosecutors are not required to identify their reasons for declining
prosecution.166 Information obtained through grand jury proceedings is
secret and only available to the public in limited circumstances.167 By
affording the prosecutor consideration of so many factors in deciding
whether or not to prosecute, an ambiguous reality emerges in which the
decision to forgo prosecution can be based on myriad factors such that it is
impossible to detect any underlying attitudinal aversion to prosecuting the
powerful.168 When civil alternatives to criminal prosecution are factored
into the decision, further ambiguity arises since those with strong networks
may advance construction of any number of civil alternatives to
punishment,169 especially in the corporate and white-collar arena where
regulatory action is often a potential alternative offered to support the
decision against criminal prosecution.170
crisis-cleanup/ (reporting that Adam Glass, who joined the SEC two years ago and is now co-chief
counsel, previously served as outside counsel to a major New York hedge fund that made billions
shorting the subprime mortgage market, and in one widely reported derivative deal (termed “Abacus”),
the hedgefund was permitted to select some of the transactions that formed the basis of Abacus,
intending to short the deal—that is, betting that the deal would fail; the firm paid $550 million to settle
the case with the SEC, without admitting or denying guilt).
166
See, e.g., Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice to Bart Stupak & John D. Dingell, U.S. Reps. (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/investigations/energy/BP.0403
08.respto031208.BP.ltr.pdf (responding to an inquiry about BP plea agreements by advising “about
relevant Department of Justice policy” and explaining that many considerations factor into the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in negotiating plea agreements, but refusing to “disclose non-public
information about . . . prosecutorial decisions” in the case).
167
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (listing the rules for recording and disclosing grand jury
proceedings). The purpose of secrecy is not to shield the prosecutor, but rather to protect against
witness tampering or influencing grand jurors, and to encourage testimonial forthrightness, thereby
reducing the likelihood of flight by those being investigated and protecting those who are investigated
but exonerated from negative consequences. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 449
(5th ed. 2009).
168
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1010–
12 (1995) (discussing the effect of blurring an act which is to be regulated by providing an alternate
meaning).
169
Large organizations or powerful corporations are able to use their size and resources to protect
themselves and their employees from criminal prosecutions for decisions made by individuals on behalf
of the corporations, even when those decisions result time and again in death, great financial calamity,
or harm to the corporation itself. See, e.g., Mundy, supra note 111 (reporting that after Forest
Laboratories Inc.’s guilty plea to misdemeanors for health care fraud, CEO Howard Soloman was able
to avoid debarment by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services—a move that would have
excluded him from jobs in the health care industry that do business with the U.S. government—by
hiring a lobbyist for $80,000 to argue against the exclusion and by marshalling support from the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, among
others).
170
This is especially true when there is an established regulatory presence or perception that civil
litigation is sufficient to address wrongdoing. See CULLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 292 (recognizing
private civil lawsuits as the legal remedy of choice in defective product cases and the heightened safety
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Today, many corporations have become conglomerates wielding both
political and economic power.171 Multinational corporations have driven
the wave of globalization, promoting free-trade agreements that permit the
free flow of goods and services, while allowing these entities to lobby for
and take advantage of favorable legal conditions.172 With threats of
corporations that are “too big to fail”173 or claims that corporate
threshold for consumer products regulated by the federal government). Thus, for health and safety
violations in the United States, the FDA and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration have
been the primary governmental vehicles for expressing societal expectations in the workplace and in
consumer goods. See id. at 292, 298 (asserting that “criminal sanctions . . . have been brought almost
exclusively by federal regulatory agencies—especially the Food and Drug Administration,” and that
there is a general unwillingness to prosecute workplace safety violation cases).
171
MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 4–5 (1990);
HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 14; see also Nancy Folbre, Risks, Radiation and Regulation, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/risks-radiation-and-regulation (“The
threat of social meltdown arises not from excessive growth of the state and its regulatory role but from
its capture by groups able to translate market power into political power: socialism for big investors,
capitalism for everyone else.”). Marshall Clinard connected the contributions of corporations and
industry political action committees (“PACs”) to the democratic process. CLINARD, supra, at 6–7. In
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court effectively gutted bipartisan
campaign finance reform legislation, stating that “we now conclude that independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”
130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). In January 2011, Public Citizen, a national, non-profit advocacy
organization, released a report on the effects of the Citizens United decision on the 2010 election cycle.
Press Release, Public Citizen, Citizens United: One Year Later (Jan. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/12-months-after. Among its findings were the following facts:
[1] spending by outside groups jumped to $294.2 million in the 2010 election cycle
from just $68.9 million in the 2006 cycle; [2] the uncharacteristically high spending
in 2010 presages blockbuster spending in the upcoming 2012 elections; [3] nearly
half of the money spent ($138.5 million, or 47.1 percent) came from only 10 groups;
[4] groups that did not provide any information about their sources of money
collectively spent $135.6 million—46.1 percent of the total spent by outside groups
during the election cycle . . . ; and [5] of 75 congressional contests in which partisan
power changed hands, spending by outside groups favored the winning candidate in
60 contests.
Id.
172
See HARTLEY, supra note 97, at 14 (describing favorable legal conditions); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS AND
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL
PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008) (reporting that eighty-three of the one hundred largest U.S.
corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens or international financial privacy jurisdictions); FCIC
REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii, 52–56 (concluding that the financial industry, which had contributed
generously to political campaigns from 1999 to 2008, was able to use its wealth and power to weaken
key regulatory constraints); see also Press Release, Remarks by the President on Int’l Tax Policy
Reform (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-ThePresident-On-International-Tax-Policy-Reform/ (announcing proposals to “crack down on illegal
overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it more profitable for companies to create jobs here in
the United States,” and to ensure that companies are not rewarded “for moving jobs off our shores or
transferring profits to oversees tax havens”).
173
See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 68, at 175 (“[V]irtually everyone involved acknowledged
that the megabanks were too big to fail, because if any one of them collapsed the system as a whole
might collapse.”); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 252 (2010) (“Citigroup was seen
as truly too big to fail, and any upset to it horrified the Fed.”); SORKIN, supra note 42, at 7 (stating that
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prosecution could cost thousands of jobs to innocent employees, there is
significant temptation for the prosecutor to hide behind the numerous and
noncontentious discretionary factors available to a prosecutor in choosing
not to charge criminal conduct or to enter into a deferred prosecution
agreement.175 Certainly when charges are brought against a corporation for
criminal conduct, but not against any individual actors, there is at least
some confidence in asserting that individual liability should also exist; a
corporation cannot act except through its agents,176 so someone has broken
a criminal law. In instances where a corporation negotiates a deferred
decision makers on Wall Street and in Washington thought they themselves were too big to fail);
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 40 (“The banks had grown not only too big to fail but also too politically
powerful to be constrained.”).
174
See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006) (discussing the Arthur Andersen
investigation). Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the “Big Five” accounting and auditing firms in the
United States in 2002, was criminally investigated for destroying Enron-related documents. Id.; Darin
Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 57 (2002).
Andersen was charged with a single-count indictment for obstruction of justice, and was convicted by a
federal jury in Houston, Texas. Ainslie, supra, at 107; Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk
Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2006). After its conviction, the firm
surrendered its accounting licenses and thus ended its accounting and auditing functions. See ISRAEL
ET AL., supra note 117, at 345. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but it was reversed and
remanded by a unanimous Supreme Court. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 697–
98 (2005) (holding that the jury instructions failed to properly convey the elements of “corrupt
persuasion” for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)). The DOJ subsequently moved to dismiss the
charges against the firm. Move by Ex-Andersen Partner Could Affect Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2005, at C9. It was the criminal indictment, however, and not the conviction that sealed the
firm’s fate. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department
of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 3 n.8 (2006) (discussing the fallout
from the prosecution of Arthur Andersen). Although the criminal investigation of Arthur Andersen
involved a limited number of employees in the Houston office of the nationwide firm, the demise of the
firm reportedly led to the loss of 28,000 U.S. jobs. See Ainslie, supra, at 107–08 (stating that
documents were shipped to Andersen’s Houston office for shredding at the direction of a Houstonbased partner); Finder & McConnell, supra, at 3 (noting that 28,000 jobs were lost after Andersen’s
indictment). The Enron-related conviction of Arthur Andersen in June 2002 came on the heels of a
large 2001 settlement with the SEC for the firm’s accounting and auditing work for Waste Management
Corporation, and an SEC suit against five Arthur Andersen officers and the lead partner for its work
with the Sunbeam Corporation; neither of these investigations was centered on the Houston office.
Ainslie, supra, at 107. Thus, by the time Arthur Andersen was charged with accounting fraud related
to Enron, the firm had demonstrated actionable misconduct on other accounts and in other locations,
suggesting a deficit in executive ethical leadership, implicating a broader firm culture of misconduct.
175
See Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013) (interview with
Lanny Breuer, DOJ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, in which Breuer offered up several
reasons why banks and senior executives were not prosecuted), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables/; Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate
Criminal Liability, supra note 134, at 974–76 (observing that removing management that engaged in,
or failed to stem, misconduct is one means of salvaging a firm and protecting investors and innocent
employees).
176
See 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 89 (2d ed. 1992) (describing
theories by which corporate criminal liability may be imputed through the acts of a corporation’s
agents).
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prosecution agreement, a non-prosecution agreement, or a civil alternative
to criminal charges, it would be difficult to prove that, but for political
connections or a well-financed legal team, these negotiated deals
demonstrate certitude that criminal charges could have, or more to the
point, should have been brought against individuals.177
In exercising discretion, prosecutors consider numerous factors, some
explicit and others implicit in the process. These factors take into
consideration case-specific sufficiency assessments, ethical obligations,
competing demands for resources, and community interests in alternative
non-criminal resolutions, among others.178 Legal limitations upon such
decisions are few, and courts will seldom interfere with the process and
only in narrow circumstances.179 Most significantly, the decision not to
investigate or prosecute is even less susceptible to interference.180
Consequently, no mechanism exists to require the prosecutor to reflect
upon the affirmance effect of declining prosecution. Nevertheless, the
social meaning of such declinations persists in elite crimes, affirming the
misconduct and undermining the rule of law.
177
Early studies of white-collar crime included both civil liability and criminal liability cases.
MARSHALL B. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 22 (1979); see also EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 13–14, 45–53 (1983) (analyzing violations of law and
crimes committed by corporations). But see Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in
Search of Theory and Scholarship, in CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 127,
129 (Leonard Orland ed., 1995) (criticizing the empirical work of Edwin Sutherland and Marshall
Clinard and his associates for including adverse adjudications by civil courts and non-criminal
administrative agencies against corporations and classifying them as crimes). These early sociological
studies of white-collar crime refused to accede to the labels placed by legislators designating certain
fraudulent actions as “crimes” while others were labeled “violations.” See Laureen Snider,
Researching Corporate Crime, in UNMASKING THE CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL: SCRUTINIZING STATES
& CORPORATIONS 49, 51 (Steve Tombs & Dave Whyte eds., 2003). Snider observes:

The underlying assumption of th[e] critique . . . of Sutherland’s . . . views, is that
“crime” is a real thing that legislators, informed by science and law, discover. If
they haven’t discovered a particular act, it is therefore not crime. Sutherland argued
against only one half of this equation, pointing out that power (not to mention selfinterest, political lobbying, media-generated moral panic, and a myriad of other
factors) sometimes prevented legislators from criminalizing the harmful acts of
business. Thus the fact that anti-competitive practices and false advertising were
proscribed, albeit through regulatory or administrative statute [and] not criminal
law, was sufficient to indicate the “real” intentions of legislators, and to justify
studying these acts as criminal.
Id. at 51; see also Ramirez, Just in Crime, supra note 112, at 372 n.72 (describing the difficulty in
reaching a consensus as to what conduct should be included in the term “white collar crime”).
178
See Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 744 (2005) (discussing typical considerations of prosecutors).
179
Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 480 (2007).
180
See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (asserting that decisions not to
prosecute are “actions that are legally authorized, but not legally regulated”).
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IV. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
Civil law holds individuals accountable for their actions by demanding
that they pay for the harm imposed on others. In contrast, criminal law
punishes individuals.181 It may also require payment or accountability, but
at its core, it is society’s decision that the acts performed by the accused
are sufficiently reprehensible to a well-ordered society that the actor should
be punished and also labeled “a criminal.”182 Serious or very costly crimes
usually result in incarceration. Serious criminal sanctions like
incarceration operate as society’s strongest condemnation of anti-social
behavior.183
In creating criminal laws, society must decide that certain conduct
requires criminal punishment and cannot be sufficiently addressed by civil
penalties. Theories of punishment identify reasons a society punishes
through criminal laws.184 The theories fall into two broad categories:
retributive and utilitarian.185 Retributive theories are backward-looking,
asserting the need for affirmative punishment deserved by the individual
for breaking societal rules.186 Under this label, several theorists have
further expanded upon the type of message and need for the message;
affirmative retribution,187 negative retribution,188 and assaultive
181
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
182
See id. at 405 (stating a “criminal” penalty is “conduct which, if duly shown to have taken
place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community”).
183
See, e.g., Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 70–71 (1995) (“The mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years with the prospect of incarceration for life represents one of the most
severe penalties prescribed under New York State law. It expresses society’s and the Legislature’s
highest level of condemnation for the most serious offenders who commit the most reprehensible
crimes.”).
184
See Hart, supra note 181, at 410 (discussing why it is difficult to have only one theory of
criminal punishment).
185
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1284
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
186
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16–17 (4th ed. 2006); see also
HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 17 (explaining that retribution theories of punishment find justification
in the offender’s freely chosen actions). Honderich is critical of retributive theories of punishment as
“conceptually inadequate” in part because they “fail to give an adequate or real reason for punishment”
and “presuppose that the offender had the power of origination or free will.” Id. at 201.
187
See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179–82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)
(“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to
punish him or her.”).
188
See HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 20–21 (observing that negative retributive justice entails the
ideas that one “who has obeyed the law must not be made to suffer even if this would have the good
effect . . . of keeping him from committing offences he is otherwise thought likely to commit,” and that
“an offender’s penalty must not be increased over what is deserved for his action even if . . . a more
severe penalty is needed as an example to deter others”).
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retribution all focus on the message conveyed to the law-breaker.
Utilitarian principles are forward-looking, seeking to maximize the
utility of society through punishment of the individual so that punishment
is worthy only if the pain caused through punishment will result in greater
benefit to society.190 Thus, through incapacitation, the law-breaker is
imprisoned to protect society from his acts.191 Rehabilitation allows
society to focus on the individual offender in order to teach him to become
a more productive member of society, one who is willing and able to
follow the law.192 Specific deterrence aims to influence future individual
behavior and thereby improve society by conveying to the law-breaker in
advance that punishment will follow his breach of the laws.193 General
deterrence punishes the individual law-breaker so that society is reminded
to avoid deviance and is assured that breaking the rules incurs
punishment.194
While many accept the retributivist idea that it is moral or just to
punish those who violate the criminal laws and impose their criminality
upon others, this lex talionis195 approach is not universally accepted.196
Likewise, while many accept the utilitarian theory that criminals must be
punished to influence their future behavior and that of society, that view is
disavowed by the Kantian camp.197 Because punishment can be justified
by more than one theory, legal philosophers need not reconcile their

189
See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81–82
(1883) (maintaining that it is “highly desirable that criminals should be hated, [and] that the
punishments inflicted upon them should be so contrived as to give expression to that hatred”); see also
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 3 (1988) (stating James Stephen
thought criminals should be treated as “noxious insects to be ground under the heel of society”).
190
See Bentham, supra note 9 (“General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment as it
is its real justification. If we could consider an offence that has been committed as an isolated fact, the
likes of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would be only adding one evil to
another.”). Bentham identified three ways to prevent crime through punishment: to incapacitate; to
deter individuals and others; and to reform or rehabilitate. HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 75.
191
TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG LU, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
17–18 (2005).
192
Id. at 22–23.
193
Id. at 20.
194
Id. at 21.
195
HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 20. Lex talionis is the latin term for “law of retaliation,”
sometimes explained as “an eye for an eye” from the Bible. Exodus 21:22–26.
196
See HONDERICH, supra note 11, at 22–29 (highlighting the circularity of arguing that one
deserves punishment for breaking the law because he broke the law). “Circular retributivism is an
instance of the fallacy where the supposed reason is identical with the supposed conclusion.” Id. at 24.
197
See KANT, supra note 10, at 195–97 (“Juridical [p]unishment can never be administered
merely as a means for promoting another [g]ood either with regard to the [c]riminal himself or to [c]ivil
[s]ociety, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
committed a [c]rime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the
purpose of another.”).
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198

differences.
The retributivists accept criminal punishment pursuant to
the justifications they find acceptable, while the utilitarians accept
punishment for its prospective impact on society.199
When criminal laws are created and potential penalties are assigned to
breaches of the law, society has (theoretically) considered what message to
convey to the law-breaker so that the law-breaker and non-law-breaker
alike can see that meaning is attached to our decision to punish.200 When
society’s criminals are prosecuted, we convey our disapproval, and the
law-breaker and other would-be law-breakers can appreciate the
seriousness that society places on such misconduct. Affirmance is also a
utilitarian approach to criminal justice in that it too is forward looking, but
rather than a theory of punishment, affirmance is a theory of antipunishment or failure to punish.201
Whereas specific deterrence
198
Congress statutorily required that in determining the appropriate sentences under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission was to take into account the purposes of
sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (stating that the court must consider various factors to
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”). Thus, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, the courts must consider, among other things, “the need for the
sentence imposed . . . [t]o provide just punishment for the offense; . . . afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; . . . protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and . . . provide . . .
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment . . . .”
Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). The Sentencing Commission recognized that, as to the competing
philosophies underlying the purposes of punishment, different purposes have greater or lesser value
with different defendants. See Steven Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which they Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1988) (stating that when faced
with advocates of deterrence and those of “just deserts,” listing criminal behavior in rank order of
severity and applying punishment, the Sentencing Commission focused on “typical, or average, actual
past practice” in punishment).
199
But see PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 50–58 (2008) (suggesting that the aggregated-effect studies of deterrence do
not “demonstrate a capacity to reduce crime rates as would justify the deterrence orientation that
dominates criminal law rule-making”).
200
Often the criminal prohibition of conduct and the assigned options for punishment may fit into
several theories of punishment, so that by imprisoning one for a crime, such as sexual assault, society
may convey the retributive idea that one must be punished for breaching societal rules, the utilitarian
idea that the individual must be incapacitated to remove the danger he poses to the public, the
rehabilitative idea that through mandatory counseling in prison, he will improve his life once freed
from prison, and the specific and general deterrence ideas that his experience with imprisonment will
encourage him to abstain from similar acts in the future and convince society to also abstain from
engaging in such acts and thereby avoid similar punishment. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 2008) (“[D]ifferent principles . . . [of
punishment] are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable account of punishment.”). Thus,
in the sexual assault example above, punishment conveys a message that women are valuable members
in this society, and their right to be free from physical and emotional assault in the most intimate of
settings is worthy of protection. If such conduct routinely went unpunished, rapists’ conduct would be
affirmed, and in so doing, lawlessness toward women in particular, but likely violence in general would
be encouraged. Moreover, the message of women’s diminished worth would be stark. But see
ROBINSON, supra note 199, at 3–6 (asserting the “dangerousness of the unarticulated ‘laundry list’
approach” of general purposes of punishment).
201
See DRESSLER, supra note 186, at 16 (contrasting retributivism with utilitarianism).
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encourages the law-breaker to follow the law and thereby to choose
pleasure over pain, affirmance encourages the law-breaker to break the law
because there is much pleasure and little or no pain. Likewise, just as
general deterrence conveys that lawlessness has a price, affirmance
reminds others that criminal law is weak against the forces of the rich and
powerful and thus encourages lawless complicity, or simply, lawlessness.
Affirmance raises concerns not fully addressed under the deterrence
theory of punishment. When the richest and most powerful echelons of
society enjoy affirmance of their crimes through non-prosecution, the rule
of law erodes as all citizens face added temptation to skirt laws and
regulations. After all, if the privileged are above the law, then the sway of
the rule of law morally diminishes for all.202 Similarly, when the most
powerful may act with impunity to enrich themselves at the expense of
society in general, their continued control over society’s most concentrated
sources of economic wealth (public corporations and large banks, for
example) becomes downright hazardous in ways beyond the conception of
mere deterrence. Wealth achieved through the criminal abuse of powerful
economic actors can crash capitalism, destroy ecosystems, and disperse
great risks to human health and safety.203 Despite the accrual of great
wealth—even hundreds of millions of dollars—to individuals controlling
these economically powerful institutions, the deadweight loss to society
may amount exponentially to billions or trillions of dollars, as shown again
and again. Affirmance comprehends these enormous knock-on losses, as
well as the loss of moral suasion inherent in the rule of law, in ways that
extend beyond mere deterrence.
Affirmance of elite crime with outsized payoffs (and outsized costs to
society) tells elites and their successors that crime pays even though
society may suffer deadweight losses that far exceed the profits of elites.
202
In fact, confidence in the rule of law in America has declined since 2007, hurting
competitiveness. According to the World Economic Forum, the U.S. ranks fiftieth in confidence in
politicians and fiftieth in government’s ability to deal with private sector at arms length. This
contributed greatly to the United States’s most rapid erosion in competitiveness worldwide. WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2011–2012 23–24 (2011), available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011–12.pdf.
203
Although this Article’s focus is on the financial crisis of 2008, tragedies such as the Deepwater
Horizon BP oil rig explosion and massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 drew worldwide
attention both for the well-publicized negligent conduct of BP, Transocean, and Halliburton; the depth
of the harm, killing eleven workers in the explosion and causing environmental destruction in the Gulf
of Mexico and communities on its shores; as well as the financial costs for clean-up and losses to
businesses in the vicinity. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL &
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING:
REPORT
TO
THE
PRESIDENT
129–31,
173
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident
_FINAL.pdf (discussing the response to the “worst environmental disaster America has ever faced”).
The commission concluded that the companies took a series of hazardous steps which appeared to be
motivated by economic concerns, and noted regulatory failures in oversight. Id. at vii–viii.
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Because the offenders’ criminal profits enhance their economic power,
affirmance promises far more costs in the future. Traditional notions of
deterrence fail to account for the impact of dangerously distorted
incentives at the apex of our system. They further fail to account for the
corrosion of the rule of law arising from high-profile advertisement of the
profitability of even the most costly lawlessness among our governing
elite. Unlike ordinary street crime, which is largely a zero-sum game, the
power, position, and influence of economic elites inflicts massive knockon costs to society generally. Law and the punishments for breaches
thereof convey social meaning.204 As discussed below, failure to punish
conveys meaning as well; one of those meanings is affirmance.
V. SOCIAL MEANING AND THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF LAW
The construction of criminal laws to convey these purposes of
punishment is so well-accepted in American society that when legislators
create new criminal laws, they do not necessarily identify which theories of
punishment are furthered by the new legislation. Instead, the social
meaning is understood; by labeling an act as “criminal,” society intends to
convey its disapproval of the conduct, to apply the negative label of
“felon” in perpetuity,205 and to subject the criminal actor to limitations on
his liberty or other punishments as identified by the government on behalf
of the society it governs.206 Criminal laws empower the government to
label and punish individuals in a meaningful way such that they can
204
See Lessig, supra note 168, at 951–52 (describing how actions convey social meaning). Lessig
defines “social meanings” as

the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a
particular context. If an action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning. If a
gesture is an insult, that insult is a social meaning. . . . [Use of the term “social”]
emphasize[s] its contingency on a particular society or group or community within
which social meanings occur.
Id.
205
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 2, 4 (2010) (discussing the loss of voting rights, employment opportunities, and
other elements of disempowerment arising from criminal conviction, in the specific context of race).
206
See HART, supra note 200, at 6 (explaining why society punishes criminal offenders). Because
of the social meaning attached to labeling one a criminal, an alternative for those entities with financial
means is to invest in lobbying politicians to deem common corporate misconduct as “regulatory
violations,” thereby avoiding the “criminal” label. See CLINARD, supra note 177, at 22 (discussing a
study of corporate crime focusing on the largest publically owned corporations in the United States);
SUTHERLAND, supra note 177, at 13–14, 45–47 (reasoning that violations of laws concerning restraints
of trade, misrepresentation in advertising, patent infringement, and unfair labor practices under the
National Labor Relations Law constitute crimes); George Hoberg, North American Environmental
Regulation, in CHANGING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN AND NORTH AMERICA 305, 313–14
(G. Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks eds., 1998) (discussing changing labels to replace environmental
“crime” with permits or licenses to pollute).
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constrain individuals from breaching these laws. The strength of a social
meaning is that it is so accepted as a part of a culture that the
understandings or expectations associated with the idea “appear natural or
necessary.”208
A. Contesting the Criminal Label
The lack of discussion regarding the purpose of punishing a particular
criminal act highlights the invisibility of the social meaning attached to the
criminal label due to society’s accepted understanding of why we
criminalize and punish. Lawrence Lessig, in The Regulation of Social
Meaning, thus observes the following two points:
The more [understandings or expectations] appear natural, or
necessary, or uncontested, or invisible, the more powerful or
unavoidable or natural social meanings drawn from them
appear to be. The converse is also true: the more contested
or contingent, the less powerful meanings appear to be.
Social meanings carry with them, or transmit, the force, or
contestability, of the presuppositions that constitute them.209
At common law, traditional felony crimes, such as murder and rape,
were described as “malum in se,”—that is, “wrong in itself.”210 Such
crimes were recognized as inherently evil. Other offenses, typically
misdemeanors at common law, were described as “malum prohibitum,” or
“a wrong prohibited.”211 The term describes offenses that are illegal not
because they are inherently immoral, but rather because the law expressly
defines the offense as illegal. Regulatory offenses are often described as
malum prohibitum because they “regulate” society rather than prohibit
immoral conduct.212 Many regulatory offenses are consequently not
treated as criminal offenses, but rather as violations of law. If a criminal
label is attached to such an offense, it may be a misdemeanor and the
207
See Lessig, supra note 168, at 955 (explaining that social meanings constrain individuals).
The passage of laws, both criminal and non-criminal, are inherently political; the true question is
whether laws are the result of social consensus or powerful interests. See Snider, supra note 177, at 49,
55 (discussing the social and political legitimization of corporate crime); see also FCIC REPORT, supra
note 2, at xviii (reporting that the Commission was not surprised that “an industry of such wealth and
power would exert pressure on policy makers and regulators” to “weak[en] regulatory constraints on
[financial] institutions, markets, and products”). The Commission observed, “From 1999 to 2008, the
financial sector expended $2.7 billion in reported federal lobbying expenses; individuals and political
action committees in the sector made more than $1 billion in campaign contributions.” FCIC REPORT,
supra note 2, at xviii, 55.
208
Lessig, supra note 168, at 960.
209
Id. at 960–61 (emphasis added).
210
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
211
Id.
212
See id. at 1045 (explaining that many regulatory violations are described as “mala prohibita”).
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punishment is likely to be a fine or perhaps minimal jail time.
Crimes such as drug dealing are arguably regulatory in nature, in that
they regulate society. Most illicit drugs outlawed by current U.S. federal
criminal laws were not criminalized initially.213 Nevertheless, drug dealing
is a felony under federal law, and after thirty years of the “War on
Drugs,”214 it carries a social meaning of inherent immorality today.
Likewise, corporations were not subject to criminal laws at first because
they are legal entities rather than humans.215 Yet, unlike drug crimes, the
prosecution of corporations and their corporate leaders for economic
crimes has been persistently attacked as anti-business216 and as waging
class warfare.217 The white-collar defense bar has been persistent in its
criticism of the extent of federal prosecution of corporations and their
executives, with some notable success.218 The Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations require prosecutors to consider the
potential impact of prosecution on investors and employees, and to
consider non-criminal alternatives to prosecution for both the corporation
and the individual.219 Drug dealers do not warrant such consideration.
213
For example, Coca-Cola was named after one of its key original ingredients: cocaine. MARK
PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND COCA-COLA: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY THAT MAKES IT 29–30 (2000).
214
See ALEXANDER, supra note 205, at 49 (discussing the Reagan Administration’s “war on
drugs”). In 1982, only two percent of the U.S. population believed that drugs were the most important
problem in the United States. The “War on Drugs,” however, spurred a dramatic increase in funding to
combat the drug trade (from $33 million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1991), and drug offense related
incarcerations soared from roughly 41,000 people in 1980 to about 500,000 people thirty years later.
Id. at 49, 59.
215
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1908)
(rejecting the common law view that corporations are not subject to criminal laws); DAVID O.
FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 57–58 (2d ed.
2004) (describing the historical development of corporate crime).
216
See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 338 (2004) (“As the trial of Arthur Andersen indicates, however, ‘whitecollar’ guilty pleas are suspect . . . [because] it is difficult to know how many guilty pleas reflect actual
guilt as opposed to perjured pleas proffered to lessen the time, expense, and anxiety of the ordeal.”);
supra note 157 (discussing the Arthur Andersen case).
217
See Baker, supra note 216, at 350–51 (asserting that “executives [who] took actions on behalf
of corporations [and their executives] that appeared to be ‘very bad,’ even though not criminal,” are
“easily demonized” because the “media obsession” with “their luxurious lifestyles make it easy to
caricature them as greedy people who achieved their elite status through wrongdoing rather than [h]ard
work”).
218
See id. at 310–11 (characterizing corporate and criminal defense lawyers’ objections to
prosecution for white-collar crimes).
219
See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.300 (stating that prosecutors should
consider “collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders,
pension holders, employees, and others not proven personally culpable, as well as impact on the public
arising from the prosecution”); id. § 9-28.1100 (“Non-criminal alternatives to prosecution often exist
and prosecutors may consider whether such sanctions would adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate a
corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct.”). Non-criminal alternatives to prosecution are also
a consideration under the principles in deciding whether to prosecute individuals. See id. § 9-27.250
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Even in the face of a potential global financial meltdown triggered by
the reckless practices of investment banks, mortgage brokerages, and
insurance giant AIG, Treasury Secretary Paulson resisted efforts to impose
regulations that would limit future misconduct.220 Key provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act,221 which were imposed to protect against future
misconduct, have been vigorously attacked as anti-business and have been
resisted from within the government as well as from the strongest players
in the financial markets.222 Whether the success of contesting the
regulation and prosecution of elite actors in the financial market meltdown
is a consequence of a persuasive message, or sheer financial control of the
message and electoral funding, is disputed. Nevertheless, in a political
climate where being a politician tough on crime has been a consistent
winner, the pullback from pursuing fraud claims against the corporate
titans who personally benefitted from the reckless policies they employed
at the major financial institutions is discordant.
B. Fair Play and the Negative Message of Inequality
Perception of fairness in the law is critical to compliance with the
law.223 Indeed, the perception that one is foolish for complying with the
law when others flagrantly disregard it without consequences undermines
the retributivist’s moral imperative to comply with law.224 Animal
(“In weighing the adequacy of such an alternative in a particular case, the prosecutor should consider
the nature and severity of the sanctions that could be imposed, the likelihood that an adequate sanction
would in fact be imposed, and the effect of such a non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement
interests.”).
220
See PAULSON, supra note 40, at 260 (describing his first person account and efforts “to resist
pressure on [executive] compensation restrictions” at companies receiving government bailout money).
221
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
222
See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, As Business Takes Aim at Dodd-Frank, Battle Shifts to Courts,
WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190477230457647031393
3175814.html (reporting on efforts to attack Dodd-Frank in the courts); Tamara Keith, New Consumer
Protection Agency Faces Opposition, NPR (July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502
/new-consumer-protection-agency-faces-opposition (describing efforts opposing the Consumer
Protection Bureau created by Dodd-Frank).
223
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 202–03 (1995) (positing that people are less likely to comply with the
law if it is seen as unjust); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25 (1990) (asserting that
people may not distinguish between the favorability of outcomes, fairness of outcomes, and procedural
fairness when accessing justness of outcomes under the law).
224
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 358–
59 (1997). Professor Kahan relies upon empirical studies suggesting
a strong correlation between a person’s obedience [to law] and her perception of
others’ behavior and attitudes toward law. . . . [A] person’s beliefs about whether
other persons in her situation are paying their taxes plays a much more significant
role in her decision to comply than does the burden of the tax or her perception of
the expected punishment for evasion.
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behaviorists have observed in a number of species an evolutionary fair play
at work.225 Confidence is diminished when members of the group perceive
that the rules are unfairly applied.226 Studying the same social behaviors in
these empathetic animals exemplifies that the survival value of “fair play”
in evolution, as it developed early on the evolutionary scale, is widespread
and prominent.227 Research by social scientists supports the conclusion that
world religions incorporate and encourage fair play which, in turn, permits
advanced societies to engage in market growth and other aspects of a
complex society.228 Beyond the social meaning of why we punish is the
Id. at 354; see also Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 327 (1980)
(“[N]o commentator writing from the deterrence perspective has suggested that legal force is the sole
mechanism of control . . . . Rather, what is emerging . . . is a model of social control containing three
inhibitory variables—internalization of norms, threat of social disapproval, and threat of legal
punishment . . . .”). Thus a taxpayer may conclude adherence to the law is “more servile than moral,”
when others fail to reciprocate in the societal compact to pay their fair share of taxes. Kahan, supra at
358. Indeed, an announced crackdown on the unrepentant tax cheat has been shown to have the
unexpected effect of less compliance rather than more compliance, as the announcement confirms that
the taxpayer truly is carrying an unfair share of the tax load due to the unwillingness of other
community members to contribute and the government’s failure to enforce the law. See Sheffrin &
Triest, supra note 18, at 212–13 (asserting that publicizing “the tax gap increases the degree to which
others are viewed as dishonest” and suggesting that this in turn will result in increased noncompliance).
225
See DE WAAL, supra note 18, at 5 (“There is exciting new research about the origins of
altruism and fairness in both ourselves and other animals. . . . By protesting against unfairness,
[humans’ and monkeys’] behavior supports both the claim that incentives matter and that there is a
natural dislike of injustice.”). De Waal recognizes that “one can’t derive the goals of society from the
goals of nature,” but observes that “nature can offer . . . information and inspiration.” Id. at 30.
Animals recognize when one of its members refuses to observe the cultural rules of fair play of the clan
and then they work to communicate to the rebel to either conform or exit the group. See FRANS DE
WAAL, OUR INNER APE 201 (2005) (exemplifying this principle with an example of a time when a pair
of apes were the first ones to come inside the zoo to eat after being beaten the previous night for
refusing to come in and thus keeping the others from eating).
226
See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 187–88 (illustrating this truth with a test of two monkeys
where one bartered and was given a favorite food, grapes, and the other was given cucumber and lost
interest and became agitated); Frans B.M. de Waal, How Animals Do Business, 2 SCI. AM., Apr. 2005,
at 73, 78 (same).
227
See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 4–7 (focusing on “the role of empathy and social
connectedness” instead of the “selfish side to our species”). But see Joseph Henrich et al., Markets,
Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment, SCI. MAG, Mar. 19, 2010, at
1480, 1480 (reporting on study spanning fifteen diverse populations suggesting that modern
prosociality regarding fair play and punishment “is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but
also reflects norms and institutions,” such as larger-scale market integration and world religions, “that
have emerged over the course of human history”).
228
See Henrich et al., supra note 208, at 1481 (“If markets and world religions are linked to the
norms that sustain exchange in large-scale societies, we expect that experimental measures of fairness
in anonymous interactions will positively covary with measures of involvement in these two
institutions.”). A marked indicator of higher intelligence in humans is empathy, a capacity to
imaginatively project a subjective state upon another and vicariously experience another’s feelings.
See DE WAAL, supra note 18, at 65–69 (acknowledging one Swedish psychologist’s assertion that “we
don’t decide to be empathic—we simply are”). The capacity to understand others also creates an
ability to harm or deceive another deliberately because cruelty relies on the propensity to imagine how
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meaning attached to who we punish and who we do not.
Professor Dan Kahan examined the connection between social
influence, social meaning, and deterrence from crime, concluding that law
can shape “how individuals’ perceptions of each others’ values, beliefs,
and behavior affect their conduct, including their decisions to engage in
crime.”230 Thus, there is the broadly observed phenomenon that while a
community may generally support prosecuting and punishing one who
murders another individual, lynchings were permissible forms of
community activity in some parts of the United States, typically with no
criminal charges brought against the perpetrators of the violence despite
thousands of complicit spectators attending these spectacles of lawlessness
and disorder.231 The failure by law enforcement to subsequently pursue the
instigators of the lynchings for criminal acts committed before witnesses
from the very community in which they lived conveyed a clear social
meaning to everyone in that community about the value of persons of color
in the eyes of the law. That those crowds did not rise up against the
neighbors who performed the lynchings demonstrated that the conduct was
culturally tolerated in the community, and that the law sanctioned
punishing some without due process while absolving thousands without
charges.
Though the days of lynching are largely behind us, the law continues
to express the social meaning of a community through the manner of its
enforcement. The use of racial incongruity as a basis for reasonable
suspicion, in conjunction with Terry stops,232 permits law enforcement to
express the message that neighborhoods have a color, and that some

one’s own behavior affects another. See id. at 210–11 (asserting that “taking another’s perspective is a
neutral capacity: It can serve both constructive and destructive ends” and that “[c]rimes against
humanity often rely on precisely this capacity”). Many animals exhibit their aptitude to empathize,
which reveals identical social behaviors to humans and is an avenue to understanding our own human
social behaviors, such as bonding, forming alliances, and conflict resolution. See id. at 122–25
(“[A]dvanced empathy requires both mental mirroring and mental separation.”).
229
See ROBINSON, supra note 199, at 2 (“[E]ach purpose of punishment when used as a
distributive principle gives a quite different distribution of punishment.”).
230
Kahan, supra note 224, at 350.
231
See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House Cases (1873),
and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 386–90 (2008) (describing the
widespread anti-black violence in the antibellum South and the limits of the federal government’s
capacity to curb such violence in the absence of state government will); see also Kahan, supra note
224, at 353–54 (identifying looting and riots as other mob activities that draw individuals without prior
criminal records or with differing socio-economic backgrounds from those who live in the affected
area).
232
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that law enforcement may stop and question
individuals under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion).
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233

individuals belong there and others do not. For those who fail to discern
this meaning—most often law-abiding minorities who are forced to suffer
the indignity of a police encounter, potentially with a frisk, or even
handcuffs—the lesson is hard-learned.234 The message to stay out of
certain neighborhoods and away from certain people may be delivered less
violently than in the past, but as Professor Bennett Capers observes, the
“stops, coming from the state, suggest a public discounting of worth, an
asterisk on our protestations of equality, a caveat to our rhetoric about
applying strict scrutiny to the state’s use of racial distinctions.”235
Discretionary enforcement of law that conveys a negative message of
inequality that some law-abiding citizens are less valued concurrently
conveys the message that some citizens are more valued.236 Every citizen
contact with the discretionary features of the criminal justice system
strengthens or erodes the meaning of a legally ordered society.237 When
the conduct rises far beyond the reasonable suspicion necessary for law
enforcement to stop and make inquiry in the moment, and instead amounts
to widespread reports of fraud for which the prosecutor is able to make a
carefully considered decision, the social meaning in choosing to forgo
prosecution of elite crimes is unmistakable.238

233
See I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 72 (2009)
(acknowledging that many minorities when choosing a neighborhood will be risk adverse, choosing
neighborhoods that are predominantly minority, “where they are less likely to face a hostile police”).
234
See id. (“[W]hen the police patrol neighborhoods and use racial incongruity as a factor for
initiating an encounter or a stop and frisk, it sends the expressive message that neighborhoods have a
color.”).
235
Id. at 68 (citation omitted); see also id. (“[L]aw-abiding minorities in predominantly white
communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the police, and law-abiding whites in
minority communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the police. The officers in
effect function as de facto border control, deciding who is scrutinized, stopped, questioned, or frisked.”
(citations omitted)).
236
See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1835 (1998) (noting
the disparate sentences for crack and cocaine, and how that disparity is a direct bias against “black drug
crime”).
237
See Brown, supra note 13, at 1306–07 (showcasing that the negative effects of street crime
laws and enforcement choices are felt most strongly by disadvantaged communities, in particular lowincome minority communities).
238
See Matt Taibbi, Outrageous HSBC Settlement Proves Drug War Is a Joke,
ROLLINGSTONE.COM (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/outrageoushsbc-settlement-proves-the-drug-war-is-a-joke-20121213 (asserting that failure to prosecute HSBC for
brazen money-laundering of Mexican drug cartel money and international terrorist-associated
organizations and accepting comparatively low civil settlement fine on the “absurd ground” that
prosecuting the financial institution “might imperil the world financial system” removes any “moral
authority” by the government to prosecute minor drug crimes and pursue asset forfeitures); Brown,
supra note 13, at 1308 (illustrating that prosecutors may, in order to avoid social harm, decline criminal
punishment for civil remedies against a fraudulent health care provider if it is the lone provider in a
community).
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C. Modeling Subversion of the Rule of Law
Members who disregard legal restrictions and are not punished become
models of bad behavior that are then followed by others who no longer
perceive a negative risk to misconduct.239 Social learning theory posits that
modeling—learning by observation and imitation—occurs after the
observer is exposed to a certain behavior.240 First, the observer must have
the capacity to understand the significant features of the behavior, such as
consequences.241 Second, in order to reproduce the behavior, the observer
must encode the observed information into long-term memory for later
retrieval if he is capable of reproducing the behavior.242 Most importantly,
the final factor in modeling behavior is the observer’s motivation, or
reinforcement, where he anticipates a positive result, or reward for the
observed behavior.243 Once modeling is encoded and the negative
reinforcement of a positive result or reward becomes engrained behavior,
the risk is a breakdown of the social order, so that there is a loss of good
behavior from previously law-abiding citizens.244 Thus, bad behavior
modeling eclipses the threat of retribution for violation of the law,
affirming that one can flaunt the legal threat and get away with it.245
Illegal conduct that appears occasional and isolated may become prevalent
if prosecution is not vigorously pursued.246
239
See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Analysis of Aggression, in ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENCY
AGGRESSION 203, 212 (Emilio Ribes-Inesta & Albert Bandura eds., 1976) (“[I]t has been shown
that exposure to models engaging in threatening activities without adverse consequences has
disinhibiting effects on observers by extinguishing their fears vicariously.”); Kahan, supra note 224, at
356–57 (“If individuals perceive that their neighbors are freely dealing drugs or routinely evading their
taxes, they are likely to infer that the risks of such behavior are small and the potential rewards high.”).
240
Bandura, supra note 237, at 206.
241
See id. (asserting that “some people do not gain much from example because they fail to
observe the essential features of the model’s behavior”).
242
See id. (“Past modeling influences achieve some degree of permanence if they are represented
in memory in images, words, or some other symbolic form.”).
243
See id. at 216 (“Unfavorable discrepancies between observed and experienced outcomes tend
to create discontent, whereas individuals may be satisfied with limited rewards as long as they are as
good as, or better than, what others are receiving.”).
244
See DE WAAL, supra note 225, at 202–03 (asserting that one’s disbelief in reciprocity is “an
out-and-out negation of why we humans live in group, of why we do each other any favors at all”).
245
See Brian Mullen et al., Jaywalking as a Function of Model Behavior, 16 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 320, 324, 327 (1990) (finding a statistically significant increase in illegal
jaywalking by individuals exposed to disobedient models, with at least one perspective of data analysis
suggesting “something uniquely powerful about the disobedient model”). Lawlessness is contagious so
that a law-abiding individual is more likely to break the laws when in the presence of peers who break
the law. See ALBERT BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS 104–07 (1973)
(reviewing studies suggesting interdependence in violent crimes such as hijackings and abductions);
Kahan, supra note 224, at 354–55 (citing studies indicating that instances of mob violence and looting
are often “interlinked” and “responsive to the decisions of other individuals”).
246
See, e.g., Stephen Joyce, Insider Trading Violations Now Evolving into “Actual Business
Model,” Official Says, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 589 (2011) (“Insider-trading conduct is changing from
relatively small, single episodes of illegal behavior to an ‘actual business model,’ where rings of
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For those who benefited from excessive fees generated through
subprime mortgage lending and risky credit default swaps, disregard for
longstanding rules and practices became so profitable that they ignored the
greater risks they were taking to achieve those profits, while others
followed this profit model in the hopes of achieving its promised
rewards.247 Once the bad behavior became widespread and its monumental
costs manifested in the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government
focused on stopping the panic in the financial markets rather than
punishing the initiators of the conduct.248 The urgent need for a financial
fix was optimal for the initial wrongdoers, since the attention shifted from
those at fault to those able to assist with the fix.249 With so many actors
misbehaving, those who financially benefitted most deflected
responsibility by laying blame for systemic failure at the doors of others—
such as the credit rating agencies that failed to appropriately rate risk and
the regulators that failed to investigate or appropriately sanction
misconduct.250 Nevertheless, the failure to counteract these models of bad

sophisticated businesspeople from several distinct industries repeatedly break the law to reap huge
illicit gains, Securities and Exchange Commission Associate Regional Director David Rosenfeld said
March 11.”).
247
See Floyd Norris, Eyes Open, WaMu Still Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at B1
(recounting how, in 2008, Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) became the largest bank failure in American
history). Although internal officers warned the CEO, Kerry K. Killinger, and the board of directors of
impending disaster from risky lending practices, and regulators were made aware of the problems as
early as 2006, no efforts were made at the bank to reign in risk and regulators resisted taking any
enforcement action until it was too late. Id. WaMu “had identified Countrywide Financial as a model
to emulate, and any other course would have surrendered market share, not to mention immediate
profits that financed huge paychecks for executives.” Id.; see also RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM,
supra note 70, at 24–25, 191–93 (describing the reckless loan practices at Countrywide Financial and
the role that CEO Angelo Mozilo played in its demise).
248
See PAULSON, supra note 40, at 253–62 (describing his push for an immediate bailout and his
insistence that Congress did not have the luxury of debating appropriate consequences for the financial
industry due to the impending financial meltdown after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which he
declared as “the economic equivalent of war”).
249
Paulson resisted suggestions that any bailout legislation include compensation restrictions,
asserting that banks would be unwilling to accept bailouts if such conditions were in the package, and
he wanted to “encourage[] maximum participation” in the bailout so that the banks would unload the
toxic assets. Id. at 260.
250
See, e.g., U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, HEARING ON SUBPRIME LENDING AND
SECURITIZATION AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES (GSES) 8 (Apr. 8, 2010) (statement of
Charles Prince, Former Chairman and CEO of Citigroup, Inc.), available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0408-Transcript.pdf (asserting the “precipitous
nature” of “dramatic[] downgrad[ing]” by the rating agencies of “widespread holdings” of “securitized
products . . . led to the general recession,” rather than excessive risk taking by the banks); see also
Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 2085, 2089–94 (2010) (describing the evolution of credit rating agencies in the United
States, the conflicts of interest undermining the credibility and integrity of the ratings system that arose
from regulatory dependence on credit ratings and issuer-based fees for ratings, and the consequential
slow response by the private rating agencies to negative information regarding rated companies that
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behavior further affirms the misconduct while permitting wrongdoers to
remain at the apex of the U.S. financial system.
Legislatures may authorize the use of criminal sanctions in statutory
language, but the use of these sanctions depends upon their application by
administrators of the law.251 This Article focuses not on the propriety of
the rules—that is, criminal laws—but rather on their use or non-use by
prosecutors and the consequential expressive message affirming criminal
misconduct. The oft-stated maxim that “no one is above the law” ignores
the “unsavory details . . . about the specific content of laws or about who
makes them, interprets them, and applies them for what purposes.”252 If
laws are perceived as being applied unfairly so that persons of wealth or
power are permitted to operate above the law, the rule of law is
undermined.253
Affirmance of the crimes of the rich and powerful sends an
have been identified as failing to alert investors to the underlying risks of companies involved in the
2008–2009 financial crisis).
251
Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 199 (1965).
252
Holmes, supra note 13, at 123.
253
The “rule of law” is a general notion defined in myriad ways, some of which are contradictory.
See Horwitz, supra note 24, at 153–54 & n.4, 155–56 (citing numerous examples by authors both
acknowledging the differences in definition of “rule of law,” as well as contrasting authors’
definitions). This Article recognizes that at a minimum, the “rule of law” encompasses Richard
Fallon’s summary of five elements generally present in modern definitions of the rule of law: “the
capacity of legal rules to be understood, efficacy, stability, the supremacy of legal authority, and the
availability of impartial legal procedures.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1997) (emphasis added). Fallon described these
concepts as follows:
(1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to guide
people in the conduct of their affairs. People must be able to understand the law and
comply with it.
(2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy. The law should actually
guide people, at least for the most part. In Joseph Raz’s phrase, “people should be
ruled by the law and obey it.”
(3) The third element is stability. The law should be reasonably stable, in order to
facilitate planning and coordinated action over time.
(4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal authority. The
law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens.
(5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice. Courts should
be available to enforce the law and should employ fair procedures.
Id. (citations omitted). This Article would extend the fifth element’s “impartial justice” to go beyond
employing fair procedures by courts to include fair practices by prosecutors that are impartial to the
political or financial status of the citizens. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at
186–91 (summarizing a continuum of views defining the rule of law from Justice Holmes’s view of the
rule of law “as mere scrivener to elite power,” to Friedrich Hayek’s view that “the rule of law be fixed
and announced in advance,” and proposing a “more durable” rule of law that “secure[s] important legal
and regulatory infrastructure from elite subversion” that limits “the economically mighty [from
imposing] massive costs on others and society generally”).
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unmistakable message: despite the obvious and extensive harm they cause
to many, elite criminals are above the law and will not pay a price to
society for disrupting its rules and imposing suffering on others. Elite
criminals are assured that they can take risks with other people’s lives or
livelihoods, their money or their environment, and reap great rewards in
costs savings, hefty salaries, generous bonuses for short-term gains in
profits, promotions, or corporate board appointments. When their crimes
cause harm, consequences are unlikely to reach them personally; at most,
the organizations they control suffer great losses—deadweight losses well
in excess of any benefits they harvest.254 Even if some individual
economic harm is incurred, the benefits will far outweigh those costs.
Affirmance assures economically powerful elites that their harvesting of
illicit profits will continue unabated.
D. Expressing the Message of Affirmance in Elite Crimes
In one of the earliest cases imposing imprisonment sentences on
individuals engaged in economic crimes,255 “[t]he court described the
defendants’ conduct as a shocking indictment of a vast section of our
economy that flagrantly mocked the image of the economic system of free
enterprise which we profess to today as a free-world alternative to state
control and eventual dictatorship.”256 Then-U.S. Attorney General Robert
Kennedy characterized the defendants’ conduct even more starkly, as a
“serious threat to democracy.”257 Elites tend to attract attention. Their
profits also reflect their degree of power. Huge payoffs amplify the
message of lawlessness for profit. Declining to prosecute elites for profitgorging crimes is bound to publicize the profitability of crime in a way that
does not apply in the case of ordinary street crime. Thus, the affirmance of

254
See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at xv (describing how the subprime
mortgage crisis yielded millions for corporate managers, but cost trillions to firms through the taxpayer
bailout of those firms); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1245–47 (2008)
(discussing how CEO primacy in corporate governance permits numerous opportunities for corporate
managers personally to benefit financially through legal and fraudulent means at the expense of the
corporation and its shareholders); Narayanan et al., supra note 74, at 1600–01 (concluding that
executive options backdating led to an average loss per firm of about $389 million, while the average
potential gain from the practices to the benefiting executives in each firm was less than $500,000).
255
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. ¶69,699 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1960)
(often referred to as the “Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases”).
256
Ball & Friedman, supra note 251, at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
257
Id. (citing JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF PRICE FIXERS IN
THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 175–76 (1962)) (recounting a television interview of Attorney General
Robert Kennedy on the subject of civil action against industrial electrical equipment manufacturers for
damages suffered by the government related to a price fixing scheme by the private corporations).

922

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:865

258

elite crimes uniquely threatens the rule of law.
When a prosecutor elects against criminal prosecution, the general
public does not have internal access to that decision and, consequently,
given the multitude of considerations factoring into the decision, cannot
fairly assess whether the cost of moving forward with a criminal
prosecution is outweighed by the benefits of a decision to drop the case,
move forward with a civil case instead, impose a regulatory fine, or
negotiate a settlement short of full prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor must
be aware of the long-term consequences of affirming crime including its
social meaning.
Perception becomes reality in the long run. Elites who violate the law
and benefit greatly from those violations without incurring personal
punishment model bad behavior for others. Observers that perceive a lack
of fair play will assess for themselves whether the costs outweigh the
benefits of adhering to the rule of law.259 Ironically, those who follow the
law and forgo corrupt profits may actually be at a competitive
disadvantage relative to those who break the law.260 The inequality in
profits and market power due to illegitimate practices causes the bad actors
to drive out the good.261 Rejection of the social order ensues as each actor
258
See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Rakoff Again Blasts SEC Settlements Where Defendants Admit No
Wrong, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 2011 (reporting on remarks by U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff
regarding the practice in SEC civil settlements that allege “terrible wrongs” but allow defendants to
avoid admitting or denying guilt and concluding that “[t]he disservice to the public inherent in such a
practice is palpable” (quoting SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2011))).
259
See SORKIN, supra note 42, at 14 (describing Lehman Brothers’s temptation to over-leverage
“like everyone else on Wall Street” by borrowing money to increase the returns on risky investments,
despite the knowledge of the great riskiness of the undertaking). Both Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch had modeled their investment risk-taking after Goldman Sachs. Id. at 28, 144.
260
See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 2 (2005) (explaining that CEO “control
frauds” manipulate the external controls over CEO power by “shop[ping] for accommodating
accountants, appraisers, and attorneys”).
261
See id. at 40 (illustrating how control frauds during the S&L crisis were “routinely able” to
find auditors from top-tier firms willing to give them clean opinions “even when they were deeply
insolvent and engaged in massive accounting fraud”); NAT’L COMM’N ON FIN. INST. REFORM,
RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1993) (same);
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xxv, 147–50 (describing the carelessness with which Moody’s
corporation assessed risk in rating structured financial products). “[I]ssuers [of credit default
obligations (“CDOs”)] could choose which rating agencies to do business with, and because the
agencies depended on the issuers for their revenues, rating agencies felt pressured to give favorable
ratings so that they might remain competitive.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 150. The revenues
from structured products, including mortgage-backed securities and CDOs were lucrative; from 2000 to
2006, Moody’s “revenues surged from $602 million to $2 billion and its profit margin climbed from
26% to 37%.” Id. at 149. In 2006, Moody’s rated thirty mortgage-related securities as triple-A (its
highest rating) every day; in early 2010, only six private-sector companies received the triple-A rating
from Moody’s. Id. at xxv.
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pursues misconduct due to competitive pressures.
Crime becomes
socially acceptable, even socially compelled, much like the lynch mobs of
the past.263
The top executives who manage these corporations sit in particularly
powerful seats because they direct the financial heft of the corporations
they govern.264 During the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government
bailed out financial institutions before regulators had an opportunity to
assess the viability of the institutions and before investigators could assess
whether fraudulent conduct had led to the crisis. Professor Bill Black, a
senior regulator265 during the Savings and Loan debacle of the late 1980s,
examined the risk of moral hazard, or adverse incentives, in the financial
markets.266 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has also pointed out that moral
hazard attaches to bank bailouts.267 Ordinarily, a bank or lending
institution that has insufficient funds to pay its depositors or creditors
would be placed in conservatorship so that it could be financially
reorganized.268 Typically, one consequence would be replacing
management while shareholders faced losing their equity interest, a risk
recognized by the shareholders when purchasing shares.269 In his book,
Freefall, Professor Stiglitz asserts that the 2008 government bailout of the
262
See, e.g., House of Cards—Original Documentary (CNBC television broadcast 2009),
available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1145392808&play=1 (including interview of
mortgage broker admitting that if he had required full documentation from loan applicants when others
were requiring no documentation, his business would have folded because customers would have gone
elsewhere); George Ackerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (expounding the theory that when “buyers use some
statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases,” “returns for good quality accrue mainly to the
entire group whose statistic is affected” and sellers are incentivized to market poorer quality goods,
resulting in a general reduction in the quality of goods available and in the size of the market).
263
See, e.g., Chad Terhune et al., Mortgage Mess: Shredding the Dream, BUSINESSWEEK. (Oct.
21, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_44/b4201076208349.htm (reporting on
rampant fraudulent conduct in mortgage loans and foreclosures, as well as the involvement by many in
the mortgage lending business, including large banks). Reporting on the reaction to the need to address
the crisis quickly, the authors observed: “The longer it drags on, the more the foreclosure crisis
corrodes Americans’ faith in their financial and legal systems. A pervasive sense of injustice is bad for
the economy and democracy as well.” Id.; see also Norris, supra note 247 (reporting that the regulators
looked the other way, investigators were ignored by their bosses, internal auditors were pushed aside,
and the board passed resolutions but “did nothing to stop the rot”).
264
See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 70, at 12.
265
See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 123–24 (2010) (statement of William K. Black),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/printed%20hearings/111124.pdf (listing Black’s regulatory roles during the S&L crisis).
266
See BLACK, supra note 260, at 6 (“Moral hazard is the temptation to seek gain by engaging in
abusive, destructive behavior, either fraud or excessive risk taking. . . . This is not unique to S&Ls; it is
in the nature of the corporation.”).
267
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 16–17.
268
Id. at 116–17.
269
Id. at 121.
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financial industry, like the bailouts of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, signals
the banks that they need not worry about risk management because the
government will “pick up the pieces.”270 This assurance permits the least
prudent bankers to continue or to repeat their reckless practices.271
The moral hazard that the bankers’ incentives to act responsibly are
weakened if they know they will be bailed out by the government because
they are too big to fail and this risks not only the need for future bailouts
that will be even greater in magnitude than the generous bailouts from
2007 to 2009, but also risks “our sense of fairness and social cohesion in
the long run.”272 Stiglitz observes that even those operating in the financial
markets objected to the bailouts as favoring the mega-institutions at the
expense of other institutions that may have been more pragmatic in their
investment strategies.273 Indeed, the whole market may become distorted
as the bailed out banks benefit from lower costs of capital due to the
recognition of “tacit government support.”274
That AIG sat in the eye of the financial crisis storm was unsurprising
given that the company and its former CEO, Hank Greenberg, had avoided
criminal punishment for past financial practices.275 As AIG’s financial
270
Id. at 135. In the bank bailouts of 2007 to 2009, the government opted to avoid
conservatorship for those too big to fail. Id. Earlier bailouts by the Federal Reserve after the collapse
of LTCM and later, Enron, gave rise to a new term by analysts to describe the behavior, “the Greenspan
put.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting First the Put; Then the Cut?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16,
2000, at 81). This term was shorthand for “investors’ faith that the Fed would keep the capital markets
functioning no matter what.” Id. at 61; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of DoddFrank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1019, 1048 (2012) (describing the implicit government subsidy in easy loans at lower interest
rates for too-big-to-fail banks due to the perception that the government would not let them fail).
271
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 118, 135; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61 (raising the
question of whether the financial industry took on more risk because of the expectation that the Federal
Reserve “would keep the capital markets functioning no matter what”).
272
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 39.
273
Id. at 39, 118.
274
Id. at 118.
275
In 2003, AIG settled a civil action with the SEC for a $10 million fine, based upon aiding an
Indiana cell phone distributor in hiding $11.9 million in losses and then lying to the SEC about its role.
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 155. In 2004, AIG settled civil and criminal charges for its role in shifting
bad loans off the books of PNC Financial Services. Id. The firm entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement with the DOJ and agreed to a thirteen-month probationary period for AIG Financial
Products Corporation (one of its operating units). Id. In 2005, AIG Financial Products Corporation
was involved in another accounting scandal for inflating AIG’s cash reserves by $500 million, resulting
in the resignation of its CEO, Maurice Raymond “Hank” Greenberg. Id. at 160. Although considered
by New York’s Attorney General, no criminal charges were filed against Greenberg or AIG. Id. In
February 2008, AIG was required to adjust loss estimates for November and December 2007 from $1
billion to more than $5 billion. Id. AIG and Greenberg are noted for their strong financial support of
political candidates and the ready access it has provided them, as well as supporting favorable
legislative initiatives, and opposing unfavorable regulations. See Leonnig, supra note 42 (reporting
that Greenberg’s Starr Foundation “gave $500,000 to support a November 2006 report by the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation [that recommended] fewer criminal prosecutions of
businesses”).
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situation faltered, it brought Greenberg back as its chairman emeritus to
draw on Greenberg’s relationships with wealthy investors to shore up its
financial distress and hopefully buy the company some time as it faltered
under the weight of AIG Financial Products Corporation’s credit default
swaps obligations.276
The AIG Financial Products Corporation was founded in 1987 in a
deal between Greenberg and Howard Sosin, who fled investment firm
Drexel Burnham Lambert for the deeper pockets of AIG,277 leaving before
Drexel Burnham pled guilty to violations of federal securities laws in 1988
and agreed to a $650 million fine, with the investment firm ultimately
collapsing in bankruptcy due to Michael Milken’s “epoch-defining” junk
bond scandal.278 Sosin brought thirteen Drexel employees with him to AIG
Financial Products, where they operated a high leveraged unit with similar
success to the prior Drexel operation.279
Notably, Joseph Cassano, who headed up AIG Financial Products and
is credited with pushing AIG into underwriting credit default swaps,280 was
one of those thirteen employees who had previously worked for Drexel
Burnham Lambert during Michael Milken’s reign of the junk bond
market.281 After Sosin left AIG Financial Products in 1993,282 Cassano
remained and was promoted to chief operating officer.283 Cassano
eventually took the helm as CEO, earning a reported $280 million during
his eight-year tenure at AIG Financial Products.284 In December 2007,
Cassano had assured investors that “it is very difficult to see how there can
be any losses” in the CDS portfolios,285 without revealing that AIG had
276
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 280. On the very day Hank Greenberg was being deposed by the
New York State Attorney General’s office regarding previous questionable accounting practices at
AIG, AIG settled a $4.3 billion lawsuit it had filed against Greenberg for about $860 million so that it
could announce that Greenberg was returning to AIG as its chairman emeritus. Id. at 272, 280.
277
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 155–56.
278
FRIEDRICHS, supra note 215, at 161. Milken pled guilty to six felony charges for securities
fraud and conspiracy. Id. at 162.
279
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 156.
280
Id. at 157. By February 2008, AIG’s outside auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, concluded
that Cassano was not “open and forthcoming” in the valuation of risk taken on by AIG, and AIG was
required to revise its 2007 estimates of losses in November and December from $1 billion to more than
$5 billion. Id. at 160–61. Although AIG’s CEO Martin Sullivan wanted to fire Cassano, he agreed to
keep Cassano on as a consultant at $1 million per month. Id. at 160–62.
281
Id. at 156.
282
Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, The Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at
A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/28/
AR2008122801916.html?nav=rss_email/components&sid=ST2010062905395.
283
SORKIN, supra note 42, at 156.
284
David Voreacos & Elliot Blair Smith, Cassano’s Statements on AIG Probed by Prosecutors,
People Say, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&s
id=a6m_BOe9Ftk4&refer=news.
285
Joe Cassano, President, CEO, AIG Fin. Prods., Am. Int’l Grp., Remarks at the Am. Int’l Grp.
Investor Meeting (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/16785264/AIGTranscript200
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posted $2 billion in collateral to Goldman Sachs to cover losses. Nor did
Cassano inform those investors that AIG had overstated its earnings by
$3.6 billion.287 Cassano was forced to resign in 2008 after the catastrophic
losses of billions of dollars288 when the subprime mortgage derivatives
began to hit and gave rise to the need for the company to report a multibillion dollar loss.289
Rather than face criminal charges due to a record of financial
misconduct,290 AIG received the benefit of a $182 billion bailout from the
federal government in 2008 and 2009. Cassano was also given a
$1 million monthly consulting fee upon resigning as CEO and walked
away with millions in earnings.291 The federal probe into AIG and
Cassano’s role in the financial crisis resulted in the unusual announcement
that no criminal charges would be brought against AIG executives.292
In 2010, a new scandal emerged as banks—some of which had been
given government bailouts—used forged or fraudulent documents in courts
to support home foreclosures.293 A group of banks had collectively created
71205T13301. Cassano made a similar statement at the prior investor meeting on August 9, 2007,
insisting that the credit default swaps were not a problem: “It is hard for us, without being flippant, to
even see a scenario within any kind of realm or reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those
transactions. . . . We see no issues at all emerging. We see no dollar of loss associated with any of [the
CDO] business.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 268. Despite those assurances, the following day
AIG posted $450 million in cash to Goldman Sachs in response to its prior collateral calls. Id. at 265–
66, 268.
286
FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 272.
287
Id.
288
See David Ellis, US Takes Another Crack at AIG Rescue, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/02/news/companies/aig/index.htm (reporting a $99 billion loss for
2008); Reuters, A.I.G. Reports Record Quarterly Loss of $5.29 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at
C2 (reporting largest loss in its eighty-nine year history after reporting a write-down of securities
exposed to bad mortgage investments).
289
Voreacos & Smith, supra note 284.
290
See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks
Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (reporting government imposed
conditions on the first $85 billion of bailout funds extended to AIG in September 2008); Nocera, supra
note 67 (reporting on Cassano’s record of financial misconduct); Plumb, supra note 42 (noting the total
amount of bailout funds extended to AIG was $182 billion).
291
Voreacos & Smith, supra note 284.
292
Efreti, supra note 64 (reporting that federal prosecutors had focused the investigation on
Joseph Cassano, head of AIG’s London-based Financial Products unit). New York Federal Reserve
Chairman Timothy Geithner reportedly visited with then-New York Attorney General Andrew M.
Cuomo and discussed AIG. Morgenson & Story, supra note 23. Although Cuomo’s investigation into
the financial crisis and its aftermath continued, no charges were filed against AIG prior to Cuomo’s
departure from the office for his newly elected position as Governor of New York. Id.
293
Complaint, State v. Bank of Am. Corp., Case No. A-10-631557-B XXV (D. Ct. Clark Cnty.,
Nev., Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.s355160796.onlinehome.us/_oneclick_uploads/2012/03/
state-of-nevada-vs-bank-of-america.pdf (containing initial claims by the Nevada attorney general
against Bank of America and related companies regarding the use of fraudulent documents used to
foreclose on homeowners); Gretchen Morgenson, A Swift Deal May Not Be a Sound One, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2011, at BU1 (reporting on the bank settlement being negotiated between state attorneys
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an organization known as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(“MERS”) and used it as the designated mortgagee in home loans rather
than the actual beneficiaries of the loans.294 By doing so, the banks
avoided additional filing fees required to lawfully record mortgage
assignments or transfers.295 As Professor Christopher Peterson observed,
the mortgage finance industry set about to create an entirely new national
system of public land title recordkeeping without seeking legislative
reform.296 Instead, “the mortgage finance industry circumvented the state
and national debate that normally precedes significant legislative
change.”297 When loans began to fail, banks realized that the failure to
properly document the transfers left them potentially without recourse in
the foreclosure process.298 Consequently, forged documents and fraudulent
affidavits in support of foreclosure actions were created and submitted to
courts in support of foreclosures.299 Despite unquestionably fraudulent
general and Bank of America and its subsidiaries to address improper loan-servicing and foreclosure
practices); Rauch & Baldwin, supra note 64 (reporting that the biggest U.S. mortgage lenders in the
United States “are being investigated by 50 state attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing
on homes without having proper paperwork in place or without having properly reviewed paperwork
before signing it”); 60 Minutes: The Next Housing Shock (CBS television broadcast Apr. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7375936n (reporting on Docx, a company hired
to sign fraudulent mortgage ownership documents prepared for use by banks in home foreclosures—
because the original documents were unavailable—on behalf of numerous banks, including Wells
Fargo, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Citibank, U.S. Bank, and Bank of America); see also infra note 303.
294
See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1361–63, 1368–70 (2010) (describing the
creation of MERS, its role in the mortgage industry, and its questionable legal role with respect to
recording mortgages and bringing foreclosures). MERS, created by Mortgage Bankers Association of
America member companies, is listed as the mortgagee (MERS claims it is a nominee) on the publicly
filed documents, and any transfers of the ownership of the mortgage loan are recorded internally in a
computer data system, rather than with the county property recorder’s office. Id. at 1361–62. “Sixty
percent of all new mortgage loan originations are recorded under MERS’s name, and more than half of
the nation’s existing residential loans are recorded under MERS’s name.” Id. at 1373–74. In addition
to avoiding further fees to the recorder’s office, MERS has also attempted to bring foreclosure
proceedings in its name, rather than the true owner’s name. Id. at 1362–63, 1372–73; see also Richard
Eskow, Pictures of MERS, Part 1: Corporate Documents Illustrate the Mortgage Shell Game,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2010, 09:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/pictures-ofmers-part-1-c_b_769181.html (listing a who’s who of MERS owners, including AIG-UG, Bank of
America, Citimortgage, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GMAC, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, Nationwide,
Washington Mutual (JP Morgan), and Wells Fargo).
295
See Peterson, supra note 294, at 1362 (“By paying MERS a fee, the parties to a securitization
lower their operating costs.”); Toluse Olorunnipa, Marshall C. Watson’s Law Firm to Pay $2 Million to
Settle Foreclosure Investigation, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25, 2011, available at
http://foreclosuregate.prosepoint.com/story/marshall-c-watson%E2%80%99s-law-firm-pay-2-millionsettle-foreclosure-investigation (reporting on the charges against one of eight law firms implicated in a
Florida investigation into shoddy foreclosure practices).
296
Peterson, supra note 294, at 1406.
297
Id. at 1405.
298
See id. at 1375–80 (suggesting that MERS does not actually own legal title to the loans
registered on its database and may not have standing to bring foreclosure actions).
299
60 Minutes: Mortgages: Walking Away, supra note 48.
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conduct, federal regulators investigating the misconduct in foreclosures
entered into consent orders against the fourteen largest mortgage servicers,
who agreed to address problems in fraudulent loan documentation and
understaffed and undertrained foreclosure operations without admitting or
denying any wrongdoing.300 As one critic from the National Consumer
Law Center observed, “These consent orders are worse than doing nothing
. . . they give the appearance of doing something while giving banks
control of the process.”301 Indeed, such agreements are worse than
nothing. They affirm unlawful conduct, encourage others to follow
unlawful actions, and undermine the rule of law by once again expressing
the message that the wealthy and powerful remain above it.302 Indeed,
early reports in the wake of the foreclosure fraud settlement indicate that
the lost documents and failures to modify loans continues.303
VI. CONCLUSION
The affirmance effect appears evident in the subprime mortgage
lending, the financial market crisis of 2007 to 2009, the generous fees and
bonuses awarded for creating a financial Armageddon, the fraudulent loan
documentation to support foreclosures, and the failure to pursue criminal
charges against any of the major actors or their legions of supporters in the
legal, accounting, and credit rating fields despite evidence of financial
fraud.304 In contrast, foreclosures continue unabated, except to the extent
300
See Alejandro Lazo & E. Scott Reckard, Changes Ordered in Home Seizures; Foreclosure
Probe Settlement Includes Fines, Compensation, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2011, at C21 (reporting that
regulators from the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. assured critics that their settlement “wouldn’t
interfere with a wider-ranging investigation conducted by state attorneys general and other federal
agencies, including the Justice, Treasury and Housing departments and the Federal Trade
Commission”); Morgenson, supra note 293 (discussing the consent orders). The DOJ and forty-nine
state Attorneys General have also reached a $25 billion settlement agreement. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Off. of Pub Affairs, Fed. Gov’t & State Att’ys Gen. Reach $25 Billion Agreement
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html.
301
Lazo & Reckard, supra note 300 (quoting Alys Cohen, staff attorney for the National
Consumer Law Center).
302
Two Nobel Prize-winning economists have recognized the corrosive effect of the mortgage
foreclosure fraud crisis on the rule of law. See Paul Krugman, The Mortgage Morass, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2010, at A33 (discussing the implications of and possible governmental responses to illegal home
foreclosures); Joseph Stiglitz, Foreclosures and Banks’ Debt to Society, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/05/banking-mortgage-arrears
(discussing how the mortgage debacle has called into question the security of property rights).
303
See Foreclosure Settlement Fails to Force Mortgage Companies to Improve, HUFFINGTON
POST, Aug. 7, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/foreclosure-settlementfails-mortgage_n_1754018.html (reporting on continued failures by Bank of America to address
chaotic mortgage lending practices that include lost documents, and empty assurances).
304
A full assessment of whether elements of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 in fact warrant
criminal prosecution or strongly suggest an error of prosecutorial discretion is beyond the scope of this
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that bankers do not want to write down the losses and further reveal the
extent of their financial plight,305 while social programs such as healthcare
are cut306 under public pressure to balance a federal budget devastated by
the cost of the bailout.307 With such lopsided consequences, it is easy to
predict that leaders in the financial industry will continue to probe for
opportunities to further violate laws in the pursuit of fortune308 or will use
their fortunes to rewrite laws to their favor,309 that others will follow in
their path,310 and that those not in the top 1% who take in nearly oneArticle. Some published reports have found there is some evidence. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH
CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 1–12
(Comm. Print Apr. 13, 2011) (providing an overview of the Subcommittee’s investigation and a
number of case studies); FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xv–xxviii (reporting the Commission’s
findings and conclusions regarding the financial crisis); Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 1–14,
In re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010)
(detailing the collapse of Lehman Brothers). This Article seeks to highlight the risks of prosecutorial
discretion that has been inappropriately exercised in connection with that crisis.
305
See Robert Lenzner, US Banks Reporting Phantom Income on $1.4 Trillion Delinquent
Mortgages, FORBES, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2011/01/12/us-banksreporting-phantom-income-on-1-4-trillion-delinquent-mortgages/ (observing that accounting rules
permit banks to allow “phantom” interest that is not actually collected to accrue on non-performing
mortgages and be reported as income until those properties are foreclosed upon, which averages about
sixteen months). Once the property is foreclosed, the anticipated interest income comes off the books,
but the banks must acknowledge the loss. Id.
306
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 398–400 (explaining how states struggled to close budget
shortfalls).
307
See id. at 400 (explaining that the federal government’s response to the financial crisis
included highly aggressive fiscal policies that “remain controversial to this day”); see also David Espo,
Obama Deficit Speech Eyes Medicare Changes, Tax Increases, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2011,
10:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/13/obama-deficit-speech-medicare-taxincreases_n_848479.html (“President Obama coupled a call for $4 trillion in long-term deficit
reductions with a blistering attack on Republican plans for taxes, Medicare and Medicaid.”).
308
See Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 119, 130 (2011)
(asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act, created to address the financial banking crisis and mortgage
collapse of 2008, will not prevent future financial crises); The 7.30 Report: Troubles Ahead for World
Economy (ABC broadcast July 27, 2010), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s29658
91.htm (providing transcript of interview with Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz during which he predicts
another financial crisis because the core problems of the crisis—too-big-to-fail banks, excessive risktaking, and lack of transparency—were not addressed, and because the banks used their political power
to protect derivative activity that generates large profits but puts America at risk).
309
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii (concluding that the financial industry “played a key
role in weakening regulatory constraints on institutions, markets, and products”).
310
Derivatives trading continues today, despite the $182 billion bailout of AIG and the global
financial crash. Insured commercial U.S. banks held a total of nearly $231 trillion in derivatives in the
final quarter of 2011, with the top five commercial banks dominating in derivatives: Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America, and HSBC, together holding 96% of the total. See
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL BANKS, OCC’S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER 2011 1, 11, 13, 17
(2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/trading/derivatives/dq411.pdf. As of 2011, the international derivatives market reached nearly
$1.7 quadrillion, up from $1.66 quadrillion in 2010. Press Release, Craig Donner, DTCC Testifies in
Support of Bipartisan Legislation to Ensure Transparency into OTC Derivatives Markets (Mar. 28,
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quarter of all U.S. income and hold 40% of U.S. wealth will continue to
lose faith in the rule of law.
Social meaning in law has evolved to the point that certain individuals,
white-collar fraudsters in particular, believe they face little risk of criminal
punishment for decidedly criminal acts. When these criminals reframe the
debate on prosecutorial discretion by highlighting the costs to society of
punishing corporations or their leaders,312 or by characterizing the pursuit
of justice as a political act of retribution313 rather than as a reasoned
decision to deter future conduct, they obfuscate their perverse influence
upon prosecutorial discretion by speaking in terms of decisional factors
that are largely deemed appropriate in this realm. Allowing money,
opportunity, or politics to influence discretionary charging decisions,
whether real or perceived, conveys social meaning that undermines
effective government, models bad behavior, and reinforces rewards,
creating a moral hazard for future wrongdoing. Before prosecutors refrain
from charging, they need to factor in the idea of “affirmance” in exercising
prosecutorial discretion so that an offensive approach to such criminality is
constructed and conveys a new social understanding for those in politically
or financially powerful positions.314 Prosecutorial discretion is broad, but
there is a need to compel the government to impose criminal punishment
upon these law-breakers so that they are constrained by the law to the
benefit of society. These laws and the enforcement of them have meaning.
Moreover, failure to enforce some laws can undermine the confidence in
all laws.315 Prosecutors must recognize the social compact formed by lawabiding citizens who obey and respect the laws and expect nothing less of

2012), available at http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2012/press_release_dtcc_testifies_in_sup
port.php.
311
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, By the 1%, For the 1%, VANITY FAIR, May 2011, at 126, 126.
312
See, e.g., Finder & McConnell, supra note 174, at 3 n.8 (discussing the disaster of Arthur
Andersen’s indictment); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165–66 (2008) (discussing
Arthur Andersen’s criminal indictment and the collateral consequences to the thousands of employees
as necessitating alternatives “somewhere in between the ‘all-or-nothing choice’ between indicting (and
destroying) a company and giving it a complete ‘pass”’).
313
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 216, at 337–38 (referring to prosecutions after the collapse of
Enron and WorldCom).
314
See Lessig, supra note 168, at 961–63 (discussing how social meaning of laws influences
actions).
315
“Basically, if you are a market participant you play by the rules, and if you are an honest
person you want the rules to be better even if it’s not to your advantage[;] that’s really what you need
for a democracy to work well.” Soros Would Make It Harder for People Like Him to Make Billions,
NPR.ORG (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2010/03/soros_would_make_it_harder_for.html (interview with George Soros, billionaire
investor, commenting on the need for increased financial market regulation).
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316

the rest of society.
Affirmance of the crimes of the powerful means they retain the power
to impose tremendous costs into the future through their continued control
of massive firms and the incentives facing others holding such power. A
petty thief may steal again when not prosecuted, but it is a zero-sum game
in which the gain to the thief is approximately equal to the loss to the
victim. In contrast, a bank CEO can engage in fraud that can result in
deadweight losses so great that they threaten to crash the global financial
system. A petty thief that evades prosecution has virtually no impact on
the rule of law, but a CEO that evades prosecution through prosecutorial
declination is an advertisement capable of tempting millions to skirt the
law. Today, America flirts with financial and corporate elites who behave
as if they are above the law, and with a public that holds the legal system
in contempt. As such, affirmance may lead to future economic lawlessness
and catastrophes.317 The DOJ’s systematic declination to prosecute crimes
connected to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 amounts to an affirmance
of those crimes and invites continued lawlessness in the financial sector
and beyond.

316
See Kahan, supra note 224, at 358 (recognizing that individuals may wish to uphold the law,
but do not want to be taken advantage of and that “[w]hen others refuse to reciprocate, submission to a
burdensome legal duty is likely to feel more servile than moral”); Lessig, supra note 168, at 955–56
(stating that how laws are enforced creates social meanings).
317
William K. Black, 2011 Will Bring More de Facto Decriminalization of Elite Financial Fraud,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/therole-of-the-criminal_b_802115.html (predicting that state and federal prosecutors will fail to prosecute
or reign in the financial market elites).

